Is Buganda’s call for secession feasible?

Is Buganda’s call for secession feasible?

There were riots in different parts of the country after the Kabaka was denied entry to Kayunga

The Buganda Question BUGANDA’S power and status struggles don’t seem to ever come to an end. Joshua Kato traces the roots of Buganda’s secession talks and asks an important question, who will be Buganda’s ally this time? Museveni has always said if a jigger is in the foot the best solution is to remove it. Some people in my constituency have suggested that if the Government has failed to adhere to democratic rules, we should fight and overthrow it,” Makindye East MP Haji Hussein Kyanjo argued during the Buganda conference on December 17. The following day The New Vision headline read: “Kyanjo sounding the war drums.” His predecessor, Yusufu Nsubuga Nsambu, for the many years he represented the constituency, also sounded war drums occasionally. Either the people there want to hear them (war drums) or they want war. Nsambu has repeatedly sung the song of Buganda’s secession for nearly the whole of his political life. “If they can’t give us all our things, let us separate from Uganda,” he proposed at the height of the central government and Mengo stand-off in September. This was after the Government irked Buganda by blocking the Kabaka from visiting one of his counties in Kayunga District. In a way, both Kyanjo and Nsambu think Buganda can no longer fit in Uganda, hence the calls for succession. And probably what Kyanjo is saying is that Buganda should fight and become independent in order to be free from the injustices brought on it by the rest of the Ugandans. Or at least, be granted a semi-autonomous status within Uganda to insulate itself from the influences of other cultures and the Government. Buganda’s crave for a special status couched today as federo, is a hereditary clarion call for being distinct? It is passed on from one generation to another. Previously, not much attention was paid to it but as militant voices pick the campaign, the rest of Uganda gets concerned. Consequently, Kyanjo’s and Nsambu’s gospel is creating a gulf between Buganda and the rest of Uganda. A Muganda following the political history of Uganda and Buganda points out: “The dislike of by other Ugandans increases whenever the word ‘war’ is used threateningly by Kyanjo.” “They want to chase us away from Buganda is what members of other communities are beginning to think.” Preferring anonymity, he reminds the young radicals like Kyanjo who are newcomers in politics that Baganda have an age-long tradition of being an accommodative tribe. Sounding a warning to old politicians like Nsambu, who is in the evening of his political life, he points out that the struggle for power should not kill that tradition. But the quest for special status is not new in Buganda. For 113 years, it has been on its agenda. It first appeared in the resistance against the colonialist let by Kabaka Mwanga in 1899. About 54 years later, Kabaka Frederick Muteesa II was exiled over resisting the East African Federation proposed by the colonial government. After independence, the special status accorded to Buganda failed to work leading to clashes between Buganda and Uganda government in 1966. Muteesa lost and found himself in exile where he later died. Before Independence, the 1900 agreement gave Buganda special status. For example, while the affairs of other regions and colonies were being handled by the Colonial Office in Britain, Buganda’s affairs were in the docket of the Foreign Affairs office. Buganda was not simply gifted this special status. It was earned by supporting Britain in colonising Uganda, including fighting Bunyoro. But relations with Britain gradually changed when in 1905, Buganda’s affairs were transferred to the Colonial Office. Buganda, led by the three regents was not happy. And soon the struggle to regain the past relations with Britain and become an autonomous state started dominating the 1920s– 1940s. The protest that included boycotts and strikes culminated in the 1953 crisis, when Kabaka Muteesa II was deported. According to the Chief Minister of Buganda at the time, Paulo Kavuma, in his book Crisis in Buganda, the deportation of the Kabaka was a culmination of Buganda’s unsuccessful demand for more responsibilities from the British. The Kabaka returned two years later, after making several concessions, including one that accepted having Buganda delegates in the Legislative Council (LEGCO), which was discussing Uganda’s national independence, rather than having independence discussions unilaterally with the British. A few years later, however, agitation for more power came up again. Several committees were set up to find ways for “Buganda’s Independence under the rule of the Kabaka.” As the rest of the country fought for independence, Buganda also fought for her own independence. A Buganda delegation went to Britain and finally a neo-federal status was agreed upon for Buganda. On the eve of Independence Day, Buganda was given her own “Independence” by the British. For many Baganda, this was understood as giving them a state that was autonomous from Uganda. The independence constitution gave Buganda powers that elevated its status making it different from other Kingdoms in the country. Buganda had it own parliament (Lukiiko), indirectly elected MPs to the national parliament, judicial system and ministers. The Kabaka was entitled to a maximum of 300 armed guards. However, Obote, the Baganda’s ally, soon started going back on his promises. He concluded that Buganda had got more than she could chew. He then moved to curb some of these powers. But even with the enviable status, the Baganda felt that they had got byoya bya nswa (hot air), especially as far as powers of the king were concerned. For example, although the King of Buganda, Muteesa, was the President of this country, he had less authority than Milton Obote, the Prime Minister of Uganda. The impasse resulted into the infamous 1966 crisis, whose echoes are still stinging the country’s ears up to today. The 1966 crisis reached boiling point after elements of the Buganda Lukiiko ordered the then Obote government to “leave their soil”. Obote responded with an attack on the Lubiri, sending Muteesa to exile. 1980-2009 Buganda has been a pot of water, simmering away. The riots over the stopping of the Kabaka from visiting Kayunga in September were just the peak of more than two years of simmering conflict between the central government and Mengo. A year earlier, the Kabaka had been stopped from visiting Buruuli. In 2008, three Baganda officials were arrested and charged with sedition. “Tukooye okujoogebwa mu nsi yaffe,” (We are tired of being humiliated in our country) said Omutaka Nakirembeka, a fiery Buganda official, in the wake of the September riots. The opposition took the standoff as an opportunity to drive a wedge between the Government and Buganda. Some Buganda officials and subjects who also have links in the opposition want to benefit from the fight between the two. These officials, mainly dominated by Democratic Party (DP) and Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) including seasoned politicians like Joyce Ssebugwaawo, Ssebowa Kagulire, Betty Nambooze, Erias Lukwago, Husein Kyanjo, Betty Kamya and others have amalgamated well with free talking Medard Lubega and Daudi Mpanga to propel the opposition as the only remaining ‘saviour’ of the kingdom. In 1962 when Kabaka Yekka, a Buganda-leaning party, wanted to stop DP from taking power, it they allied with UPC. Later the alliance broke and Baganda vowed to teach UPC a lesson. The chance came in 1980 elections and subsequent war in Luweero. The anger of 1966 was still fresh in people’s minds. Most Baganda turned around to support DP, which they hated in 1962, in a bid to defeat Obote. DP was the most popular party in Buganda. However, the elections were rigged and their only hope of defeating Obote faded. When President Yoweri Museveni went to the bush, he tapped into the anti-Obote sentiments and mobilised the Baganda to take out the UPC government. Fighters like Haji Abdul Nadduli insist an agreement was signed to grant Buganda federo. But Museveni maintains no such agreement was signed. However, Kabaka Ronald Muwenda Mutebi visited Museveni in 1985, but this was long after the NRA had established themselves as a big army. At the end of the war, Mutebi abandoned exile and returned to be crowned as Kabaka in 1993. From then on the Government embarked on correcting past mistakes by returning confiscated properties by the Obote government. The restitution of traditional rulers was not without opposition, but Museveni managed to persuade the National Resistance Council and the army’s high command. Among the key things returned is the Lubiri of Mengo, and the area around it, other palaces in Banda, Kireka and Bamunanika, the Kabaka’s 350 square miles of land. Buganda also got back the buildings that formerly housed Masaka Technical Institute in which Mutesa II Royal University is now housed. Some of the former Saza and gombolola headquarters that were once occupied by the local governments have also been returned. During the making of the 1995 Constitution, the federal question was one of the most contentious. It was however defeated, largely because Buganda delegates did not mobilise well enough. A loose status, called charter was, however, put in the Constitution. And a provision for decentralisation of power from the centre to the districts was included. This was seen as the beginning of the journey to a federal arrangement. It was further improved with the regional tier where districts agree to form a regional government. Some Baganda embraced this. During talks between the central government and Buganda between 2002 and 2005, Katikkiro Joseph Mulwanyamuli Ssemwogerere and several other officials signed the regional tier agreement. However, it was later deemed as “unacceptable” and trashed. On second thoughts the Baganda rejected the provision of an elected Katikiro. But they are in agreement with all the others. The Government has now moved on implement the regional tier system, but Buganda still insists it is not right because “it is oppressive” to them. Who will back Buganda? When Buganda attempted to secede on December 31, 1960, it discovered that it lacked the political, economic and military muscle to do so. That has not changed. Fighting for secession is a dream, but one that is capable of causing trouble in Uganda. In his previously secession proposals three years ago Hussein Kyanjo, suggested the central Government vacates Buganda. Kampala, Uganda’s capital, is located in Buganda. It has grown on national taxes contributed by all Ugandans. Therefore, it is difficult for the central government to vacate Kampala. Instead Buganda should be proud that it hosts the seat of the Government. But according to Kyanjo: “Whoever has contributed to Buganda’s development can be compensated.” What he does not say is how the compensation can be done and where the money to compensate them will come from. His other proposal to rid Kampala of government is war. Historically, however, Baganda has never fought alone. They always seek support of allies against their enemies. In the late 1890s, they had the British. In the fight towards independence, they formed Kabaka Yekka against Ben Kiwanuka and had Obote’s support. Against Obote, they had Museveni in the 1980s. The question is who will be their partner in the war to secede? Published on: Saturday, 26th December, 2009

Obote to M7:One Buganda game but different players(part 2)

UGANDA 60-YEAR CONFLICT (PART 2): Once bitten, never shy

News

Written by HENRY LUBEGA

Wednesday, 23 December 2009 22:11

Kabaka Mutesa sent (without) packing, again Mutesa passing out prsion officers at Luzira This is the second part of our special series on the tug of war between Buganda and the central government, putting this year’s bloody clashes and the continuing stand-off in a historical context. The first part showed how the current conflict is uncannily similar to the clashes of 1966 and 1953. In this part, HENRY LUBEGA takes a closer look at how Kabaka Edward Mutesa fell out with the colonial authorities, and then with the Obote government, with disastrous consequences for king, kingdom and country: President Milton Obote’s attack on Kabaka Edward Mutesa in 1966 is widely regarded as the beginning of the culture of repression and use of the gun to settle differences that bedevils Uganda to this day. The flight of the Kabaka into exile remains one of the darkest moments in Buganda’s history. Yet long before Uganda’s independence in 1962, there were already strong signs that Buganda would, at best, have an uneasy relationship with the central government. In the 1920s and 30s, the British considered forming a closer union among their East African colonies – Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, as Tanzania was then known. The idea was vehemently opposed in Uganda, especially by the Baganda. They feared that the federation would open doors to European settlers, as had happened in Kenya, and that their ancient kingdom, with its treasured culture, would be swallowed up in a bigger East Africa. The idea was shelved, but not completely discarded. Following the appointment of Andrew Cohen as the governor of the Uganda Protectorate, a memorandum on Constitutional Development and Reform in Buganda was signed by the Governor and Kabaka Edward Mutesa in March 1953. The memorandum stated that “Uganda had been and would continue to be developed as a unitary state.” A few months later, the governor announced changes that included an increase in African representation in the Legislative Council, the Governor’s Executive Council, and having the majority of the Lukiiko members elected, not appointed by the Kabaka. These reforms were the prelude to the 1953 crisis that saw Kabaka Mutesa exiled to England. The Lukiiko was, in particular, opposed to having an increase in elected members. However, Mutesa convinced the Lukiiko to accept the move, reasoning that it would then be harder for the governor to ignore the views of a largely elected Lukiiko. But as the tension over the increase of elected members of the Lukiiko subsided, a fresh burst of anger was stirred up by what Mutesa called a “careless remark” by the Secretary of State for Colonies, Oliver Lyttleton. On June 30, 1953, Lyttleton, making a speech to the East African Dinner Club in London, said: “Nor should we exclude from our minds the evolution, as time goes on, of still wider measures of unification and possibly still larger measures of federation of the whole East African territories.” There was immediate protest from Buganda, whose old fears about East African federation, and the loss of the kingdom’s special position in Uganda, were re-ignited. “It was clear that a crisis was under way. The mention of federation in East Africa was enough to bring all Baganda anxiety frothing to the surface,” Mutesa wrote in his book The Desecration of My Kingdom. In protest, the Kabaka agreed to the Lukiiko’s request not to nominate members to the Legislative Council. Kabaka sent (without) packing Mutesa, however, held confidential talks with Cohen. He writes, “We drafted what was to be seen as joint statements by the two of us, which I was to read to the Lukiiko. [I] withdrew my demands and accepted the re-assurances already given…our talks had been confidential, I had already been refused permission to tell the Lukiiko what was happening.” Mutesa wanted to inform the Lukiiko of this tricky situation, much to the governor’s displeasure. “We had reached a curious position where Sir Andrew demanded that I should use all my power to help him implement a policy of which I disapproved as strongly as they (Lukiiko) did.” “The struggle was now personal, courtesy collapsing. Sir Andrew was talking in threats, and he finally asserted: ‘If you don’t agree, you will have to go.’ My reply was: ‘If anyone has to go, it will certainly be you’.” The protectorate government withdrew its recognition of the Kabaka on November 20, 1953, on grounds that he had failed to give royal co-operation to Her Majesty’s Government as required by article 6 of the 1900 Buganda Agreement. On November 27, Sir Andrew sent Mutesa an ultimatum to meet his demands. Mutesa insisted on consulting the Lukiiko. Three days later, on November 30, Mutesa was given deportation orders. “I asked if this meant that I was under arrest and was told that it did. [I had] a hazy feeling that perhaps I should shoot this man.” He didn’t, as without even a piece of luggage, Mutesa was flown aboard a Royal Air Force plane to Tangmere in Sussex, England. A state of emergency was declared in Buganda. The non-cooperation, which followed between Mengo and the protectorate government, forced the Governor to invite Sir Keith Hancock to head a committee that included leading Baganda to resolve the crisis. This committee, which sat at Namirembe, led to the Namirembe Conference, which was the basis of the Buganda Agreement and Constitution of 1955. The agreement paved the way for Mutesa’s return from exile. The 1955 agreement left Buganda, and especially the Kabaka, in a weakened position. Although the colonial government agreed not to raise the issue of the East African Federation “either at the present time or while local public opinion on the issue remains as it is at the present time”, it did not rule out resurrecting the question in future. More significantly, the agreement made the Kabaka, a constitutional monarch, spelling out the limits of his powers and those of the Lukiiko. His ministers were also given some political powers, thereby creating different centres of power. All major decisions by the Kabaka and the Lukiiko, including the appointment of ministers, would be subject to the approval of the governor. Down but not out Only three years later, however, another clash occurred between the Mengo and protectorate governments over the issue of direct election of Buganda’s representatives in the Legislative Council. As a result, from 1958 to 1961, Buganda was not represented. Towards the end of 1958, the appointed Lukiiko passed a resolution terminating all the agreements signed between Buganda kings and Her Majesty’s Government. They demanded that powers that had been surrendered to the crown government should be returned to the Kabaka. The Secretary of State for Colonies, Lord Iain Macleod, met the Kabaka in August 1960 with a delegation from the Lukiiko to iron out their differences, as the country prepared for the 1961 elections that would pave the way for independence. Buganda’s response was two fold: boycott the elections and declare the kingdom’s own independence. In September 1960, the Lukiiko submitted a memorandum to the Queen, outlining a “plan for an independent Buganda”. Under the plan, an independent Buganda would maintain friendly relations with Her Majesty’s Government, remain a member of the Commonwealth, and seek admission to the United Nations. Buganda would have her own army with the Kabaka as commander in chief. Arrangements for Buganda’s independence were to be completed by December 31, 1960. On January 1, 1961, the Lukiiko declared Buganda’s independence. Little effort, however, was made to bring the declared independence into reality. As the Lukiiko had decided to boycott the March 1961 elections, it asked people in Buganda not to register for the elections. Some Baganda, however, chose to participate. Obote The two main parties contesting the elections were the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) headed by Apollo Milton Obote and the Democratic Party (DP) led by Benedicto Kiwanuka. Both parties shared the view that Uganda should continue as a united country. They viewed Buganda’s demands as a threat to that unity as the country moved towards independence. DP won 20 of the 21 seats on offer in Buganda. Having secured another 23 in other parts of the country against UPC’s 35, the Democratic Party formed the government headed by Benedicto Kiwanuka as Chief Minister. Having failed to secede and the future of the Kabaka and the kingdom in an independent Uganda being uncertain, Buganda changed strategy. It decided to push for a federal status, which would ensure the continued existence of the kingdom, and secure for the Kabaka a superior position within an independent Uganda. In June 1961, thousands of Baganda chanting “Kabaka Yekka” (only the king) staged demonstrations against the government of Benedicto Kiwanuka, whom they viewed as a traitor. “Kiwanuka’s sins were threefold. He was a Catholic who had opposed the Protestant establishment in the Kingdom of Buganda; he had fought the [1961] election despite the boycott declared by the Kabaka’s government, he was a Muganda and a commoner who had dared to set himself above the Kabaka,” writes I.R. Hancock in the Journal of African History (1970). This anti-Kiwanuka movement led to the founding of Kabaka Yekka (KY) as a political party to fight DP and to promote Buganda’s tribal interests. Kabaka, Obote jump into bed At the first Constitutional Conference in London in September 1961, also known as the first Lancaster Conference, to negotiate Uganda’s independence, Benedicto Kiwanuka, as the Chief Minister, vehemently opposed the idea of having Buganda’s representatives to the National Assembly indirectly elected. He knew that DP would stand no chance of winning elections in Buganda in a process controlled by Mengo. UPC, which had been completely beaten by DP in Buganda in the March 1961 elections, smelt an opportunity to dislodge DP from government by allying with Buganda. The UPC delegation, therefore, sided with Buganda, marking the birth of the ill-fated UPC-Buganda alliance. In March 1962, direct elections to the Lukiiko were held in Buganda for the first time. In a deal with KY, UPC did not contest any seat. KY easily beat DP, taking 65 out of the 68 seats.  Since it had been agreed that Buganda’s representatives to the National Assembly would be elected indirectly, with the Lukiiko serving as the electoral college, KY’s victory meant that DP had no chance of remaining in power. When the April 1962 general elections were held, DP won 24 seats and UPC 37. The Lukiiko’s indirect vote handed 21 seats to KY. As agreed earlier, UPC and KY formed a coalition government with Milton Obote as Prime Minister, ahead of Uganda’s independence on October 9, 1962. Through a constitutional amendment, a provision was made for the non-executive positions of President and Vice President, to be elected by the National Assembly. On October 4, 1963, five days before the country’s first independence anniversary, Sir Edward Mutesa was elected President and Sir Wilberforce Nadiope, the Kyabazinga of Busoga, Vice President. From the start, the UPC-KY alliance was doomed to fail. While UPC presented itself as a national, progressive party espousing national unity, KY was unashamedly tribal and conservative, pushing for Mengo’s interests. The only thing the two had in common was the desire to kick DP out of power. As Samwiri Karugire wrote in A Political History of Uganda (1980), “the coalition between the UPC and the Mengo government was a cynic’s delight because the two parties had divergent views on almost every conceivable subject”. It did not take long, therefore, for the two to clash. Honeymoon ends early Once in power, Obote started moves to weaken Mengo’s influence. Through patronage and promises of rewards, Obote got a number of KY members in the National Assembly to switch allegiances to UPC. In January 1963, UPC decided to field candidates against KY candidates for two seats in the Buganda Lukiiko but failed. Although the UPC-KY alliance prohibited UPC from opening branches in Buganda, Obote felt strong enough by early 1964 to do so. The remaining KY members considered forming an alliance with DP. The election of the Kabaka as president had been seen as an effort to bridge the rift between Mengo and the rest of the country, but it seemed to have the opposite effect. The Prime Minister and the President were jostling for state power. Even on seemingly trivial things, such as whose picture appeared where, became a matter of contention. The constant display of the Prime Minister’s portrait rather than that of the President when playing the national anthem on national television, for example, displeased Mutesa and his supporters. One of the main sources of disagreement between the Kabaka and the central government was the future of the “lost counties”, which had been taken from Bunyoro and given to Buganda by the colonial authorities, as a reward for its (Buganda’s) support. The independence constitution had provided for a referendum in the “lost counties” for them to decide their fate. But as census figures showed that the Banyoro outnumbered the Baganda in the area, Buganda was strongly opposed to the referendum. Despite Buganda’s opposition, the Obote-led government pushed ahead with the referendum in November 1964. Having gained a majority in the National Assembly, UPC was no longer reliant on KY support. As expected, Buyaga and Bugangaizi counties voted in favour of returning to Bunyoro. The Kabaka’s government challenged the validity of the referendum in the High Court and lost. Its appeal in the Privy Council was dismissed in April 1965. The loss of the two counties to Bunyoro sparked off angry scenes among the Baganda in Kampala. Buganda’s Katikkiro (Prime Minister), Michael Kintu, was blamed, forcing his government to resign. Kintu was replaced with Mayanja Nkangi, a former minister in the central government, who had resigned following the collapse of the UPC-KY alliance. Whereas UPC didn’t need KY any more, a fierce power struggle was raging between Milton Obote and the newly-elected Secretary General, Grace Ibingira, for the control of the party. Ibingira, a cabinet minister, was elected Secretary General during the UPC delegates’ conference in December 1964, in Gulu. His aim, he later claimed, was “to build resilience in the UPC against Obote’s tendency to grab all power and promote militarism”. However, some historians say that on the contrary, Obote supported Ibingira’s bid against his critic, who was then incumbent Secretary General, John Kakonge. Whatever the truth, Ibingira emerged as Obote’s main rival, gaining the support of the Prime Minister’s enemies, including Kabaka Mutesa and Buganda Kingdom. The stage was set for the 1966 crisis. The catalyst, however, didn’t come from Buganda or even Uganda, but Zaire, as the Democratic Republic of Congo was then known. Amin takes centre stage Amin In January 1966, Daudi Ocheng, the former Secretary General of KY and a close friend of Edward Mutesa, attempted to move a motion in the National Assembly calling for an investigation of Deputy Army Commander, Col. Idi Amin, over corruption. The UPC parliamentary group refused to support it. He had tried to move the same motion earlier in 1965 without success. Amin, who was seen as Obote’s confidant in the army, had been accused of involvement in gold and ivory smuggling during military operations in support of Congolese rebels in Eastern Congo. Milton Obote and some of his ministers, including Adoko Nekyon and Felix Onama, were being linked to the alleged smuggling. Obote told cabinet and UPC parliamentarians that Amin had admitted to having large sums of money on his account, but it was money received from the Congolese rebel group to buy military supplies. The rebel group, headed by Christopher Gbenye and General Nicholas Oleng, was fighting the government of Moise Tshombe, who was seen by Obote as a traitor to the cause of African independence. He had been involved in the assassination of Congolese independence leader, Patrice Lumumba. Obote had tried to keep support to the rebel group secret, since it had not been officially sanctioned by the government. During a cabinet meeting on February 4, while Obote and his key supporters were on a scheduled visit to West Nile, Grace Ibingira, a minister of state, mobilised his group to support the motion against Amin. Cuthbert Obwangor, who was then acting chairman of cabinet, didn’t have the numbers to block the decision. They asked Daudi Ocheng to re-table his motion. The same day, February 4, Ocheng tabled the motion in the National Assembly. He accused Obote, Adoko Nekyon and Felix Onama of involvement in the gold and ivory scandal, along with Amin. The motion calling for suspension of Amin while investigations were conducted was adopted. Obote interpreted the move as an attempt by Ibingira and his supporters, including Ocheng and Kabaka Mutesa, to overthrow his government with the backing of the Army Commander, Brig. Shaban Opolot. There were reports of mysterious troop movements in and out of Kampala in the following days, as the two sides sought to place loyal forces in the capital. Gloves off in showdown Upon his return to Kampala on February 13, Obote discovered that the Kabaka had approached the British High Commissioner seeking military assistance. He twice tried to reach the Kabaka by phone but failed. On February 15, Obote accepted to set up a commission of inquiry into the allegations against Amin, Nekyon and Onama. The commission was headed by Justice Sir Clement Negeon de L’estang of the Court of Appeal. He sent Amin on a two-week leave, short of the suspension demanded by the Ocheng motion. (In a report eventually published in August 1971, the commission exonerated Obote and the others). While seemingly implementing the parliamentary motion, Obote also moved against his rivals. During a cabinet meeting on February 22, 1966, he arrested Grace Ibingira, the UPC Secretary General and Minister of State; Balaki  Kirya, Minister of Mineral and Water Resources; George Magezi, Minister of Housing and Labour; Dr. E.B.S. Lumu, Minister of Health, and Mathias Ngobi, Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives. The following day, he promoted Amin to take over the army command and moved Shaban Opolot to the newly created post of “military adviser” to the cabinet. To complete the coup against his own government, Obote suspended the 1962 Constitution, removing the Kabaka from the presidency and assuming all powers. In April 1966, Obote convened the National Assembly and had the changes ratified without debating the new Constitution. Obote became the executive president, with John Babiiha as his Vice President. Baganda members of the National Assembly refused to swear allegiance to the new constitution. It was also rejected by the Lukiiko, a day after its adoption.On May 20, 1966, the Kabaka’s government issued an ultimatum to the central government, ordering it to leave Buganda soil by the end of that month. Buganda chiefs were called upon to stir up rebellion in their respective areas while a number of Baganda flocked to the Kabaka’s palace in Mengo. Obote reacted by declaring a state of emergency in Buganda on May 23. The following morning, on May 24, police was called in to intervene in the chaotic situation around the Kabaka’s palace. Later in the day, the Minister of Defence, Felix Onama, asked Obote to authorise the deployment of the army to “restore order”. Obote sent in the army under the command of Idi Amin. He stormed the palace, overpowering the Kabaka’s guards who attempted to put up resistance. During the fighting, the Kabaka escaped by climbing over the wall. He fled to England through Rwanda. For a second time, Buganda’s conflict with the central government had ended with the Kabaka being forced into exile. Who should be blamed for the 1966 crisis? To most Baganda, the answer is obvious: Milton Obote. However, some writers have pointed out that other actors, notably Kabaka Mutesa and his confidante Daudi Ocheng, the Mengo government and the Lukiiko, the ambitious Grace Ibingira, and even the tactless Benedicto Kiwanuka, should all share in the blame. As historian Phares Mutibwa has written in Uganda Since Independence (1992), “In the final analysis, the issue between Mengo and the central government was the basic constitutional one of where power actually resided: in a local unit (Buganda) or with the central authority (Obote’s UPC government). Personalities came into the story merely as catalysts.” The 1995 Constitution may have tried to answer the question, but it certainly didn’t answer it to the satisfaction of all parties, hence the current tussle between President Museveni and Kabaka Mutebi. // <![CDATA[// <![CDATA[ var prefix = 'mailto:'; var suffix = ''; var attribs = ''; var path = 'hr' + 'ef' + '='; var addy6139 = 'opusml' + '@'; addy6139 = addy6139 + 'yahoo' + '.' + 'co' + '.' + 'uk'; document.write( '‘ ); document.write( addy6139 ); document.write( ” ); // ]]>opusml@yahoo.co.uk // <![CDATA[// This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it // <![CDATA[// <![CDATA[ document.write( '’ ); // ]]> Next Thursday: Did Mengo have illegal guns as claimed by Obote? How did the Kabaka escape? Mayanja Nkangi narrates how he tried to save the situation, and Daudi Ocheng’s widow talks about the curious friendship between Ocheng and the Kabaka, and how she got caught up in the 1966 crisis.

SMS Radio Says Ugandan Imprisoned In USA For Starting Competitor To UNAA

SMS Radio Says Ugandan Imprisoned In USA For Starting Competitor To UNAA
Posted on 24 December 2009
According to the cell phone radio Ekiba Kibe Program of Saturday December 18, 2009, one of the leaders in newly formed Ugandan Diaspora and American Development Association (UADA), is in a USA immigration jail after being reported by UNAA officials. In the Luganda program, Mr. Robert Kabuye e Boston, explains that one David Aligaweesa  was arrested after Mr. Moses Wilson, UNAA president, and his supporters reported him to the USA immigration services.   Aligaweesa’s immigration papers are not in good order. According to sources in Boston, UADA plans to hold a convention in Boston in September, to compete directly with the 2010 event, which will be in Washington DC.
UADA is one of at least three breakaway organizations that have been formed in the wake of the controversial 2009 UNAA elections in Chicago. One was formed by Flex Kabuye, who was reportedly sponsored by the NRM to be a spoiler in Chicago. The second one, Ugandans in The Diaspora, was formed by one James Kabonge but details about it are still sketchy. And the third is UADA, where David Aligaweesa is one of the principals. All these are run by Baganda and are in direct competition with Museveni funded UNAA where the key players are Moses Wilson (President), Ssenoga, Gaburungi, Fred and Brenda Kalema Musoke, Moses Kalemba, Rosette Serwanga and Alex Zabasajja.
The December 18, 2009 Ekiba Kibe also exposes the visit to the USA by Kahinda Otafiire, to bring bribe money for Ugandan spies in America. It also reports on the Buganda Conference and explains the evils of the NRM’s new land bill.
Ekiba Kibe program is broadcast to people’s cell phones as multi-media messages (MMS) that you can you can play on your cell phone, if it has the MMS feature. This writer knows of some people in Uganda who receive the Ekiba Kibe program on their cell phones.

Obote to Museveni: One game, different players(part 1)

UGANDA 60 – YEAR CONFLICT: Obote to Museveni: One game, different players

News

Written by Michael Mubangizi

Wednesday, 16 December 2009 22:02

This year (2009) will go down as one of the bloodiest in Uganda’s history, thanks to the riots of September 10 – 12 in Buganda that killed at least 30 people and left scores injured. Long in the brewing, the riots were sparked off by the government decision to stop Kabaka Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II from visiting Kayunga, a part of his Buganda Kingdom. The clashes brought back memories of similar confrontations in 1953 and 1966, with many fearing that the Kabaka may, yet again, be booted out of his palace. That fear may not have come to pass, but the political fallout could still turn out to be just as significant. In a special series beginning today, The Observer provides historical context to the latest duel between Buganda and the central government, and examines what the future holds for the relations between the two rivals, and for Buganda’s place in Uganda. In today’s maiden part, MICHAEL MUBANGIZI asks whether the 2009 confrontation is any different from the earlier ones. Buganda is angry over land. It believes the central government is trying to weaken the kingdom by breaking it up. The government, on the hand, suspects that opposition politicians and foreign countries are using Buganda to undermine it. A crisis is brewing. The country’s leader picks up the phone and calls the Kabaka to discuss the situation. The Kabaka does not take the calls. The crisis comes to a head, leaving scores dead and injured. Though it could well be, the year is not 2009. It is 1966. The leader is Apollo Milton Obote and the Kabaka is Frederick William Mutesa Walugembe. It is remarkable how similar the current standoff between Buganda and the central government is to the crises of 1953 and 1966. In both cases, Kabaka Mutesa found himself exiled to England.   On November 30, 1953, he was deported by the Protectorate government for rejecting the proposed East African federation and insisting on Buganda’s autonomy. Mutesa returned to the country two years later, on October 17, 1955, but it didn’t take long before he was forced back into exile after the May 24, 1966 armed raid on his palace ordered by Obote. The two events could be the darkest in the history of Buganda Kingdom. Recounting his 1953 deportation, Mutesa writes in his book, Desecration of My Kingdom, “The news [of the deportation] struck the Baganda like a physical shock.” He adds that most Baganda refused to shave until he returned from exile. His sister, Alice, died and brother, Henry, vomited when they learnt of his banishment. The demise of Mutesa in Britain three years later after the 1966 attack on the Lubiri, is an issue for which Baganda have never forgiven Obote’s party, the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC). When Obote died, ironically in exile, on October 10, 2005, some Baganda jubilated. Obote’s casket was denied passage in parts of Buganda on its way to his ancestral home in Akokoro, Apac. HISTORY REPEATS SELF Ssekabaka Mutesa’s wedding in 1958 There are parallels between Buganda’s rejection of the proposed East African federation, which led to Mutesa’s deportation in 1953, and the kingdom’s lukewarm response to current efforts to turn the East African Community into a federation. In fact, the proposed regional federation is expected to come under attack during the Buganda Conference that kicks off at Hotel Africana this Thursday (Read details of Mutesa’s deportation in the next issue). Although Buganda has not officially rejected the proposed East African Federation, there are those in the NRM government who regard the kingdom’s unrelenting push for “federo” (federal status within Uganda) as a stumbling block to the East African unity.   In January 2008, The Observer reported that an army officer, Capt. Vincent Bitature, had authored a document for the UPDF leadership calling for the dismantling of Buganda Kingdom and other communities that might oppose the East African Federation. Among other actions, Capt. Bitature called for the abolition of the mailo land tenure system in Buganda, the return of Nakasongola and Buwekula to Bunyoro, and the division of Buganda into pre-1850 kingdoms. “The aim of all such changes is to weaken all those propelling the parochial interests of Buganda and any other community likely to support Buganda’s hard line position towards the East African Federation,” said Bitature’s document. (Why Kabaka Refused to Meet Museveni, The Weekly Observer, January 3, 2008). Some will see the passing of the Land Bill, despite Buganda’s opposition, and the propping up of “Sabanyala” Capt. Baker Kimeze, which are at the centre of the current standoff, as an implementation of Bitature’s proposals. On May 20, 1966, four days to the Lubiri attack, a charged Buganda Lukiiko (parliament) passed a George Kaggwa motion ordering the central government to vacate Buganda soil within 10 days. “Unless we pass the motion of no confidence in Dr. Obote today, he will not understand that we have rejected him and his constitution,” the Uganda Argus of May 21, 1966 quotes a Lukiiko member, Sheik Kulumba, as saying during the fiery debate. Commentators say this resolution played into the hands of Milton Obote, who used it as an excuse to attack the palace. (In the coming series, find out why the Katikkiro at the time, Jehoash Mayanja Nkangi, opposed the resolution and how he was defeated). The resolution followed the revocation of the 1962 constitution on February 22, 1966, ending Buganda’s cherished federo and monarchical rule. PIGEON HOLE Under the new “pigeon hole” Constitution, Buganda lost its revenue collection under the mailo land system and the right to send indirectly elected members to Parliament. After the constitutional annulment, Kabaka Mutesa petitioned the UN Secretary General, challenging Obote’s decision. “The Uganda constitution of 1962 as amended, gives the Prime Minister power to move in Parliament by way of a resolution to remove the president. This procedure was open to Dr. Obote, why did he not avail himself to that procedure?” the Kabaka, who was then president of Uganda, wrote in his memo to the UN boss. He added: “It is difficult and in fact almost impossible to expect me or the people of Buganda, and indeed some other parts of the country, to accept the new Constitution. The acceptation of that document would mean the unconditional surrender of our power for which some of us would be prepared to undergo the most gruesome experience.” The attempt to evict the central government from Buganda in 1966 was, in effect, an attempt at secession. It was not the first time Buganda had tried this course of action. On January 1, 1961, as Uganda prepared for independence, the Lukiiko proclaimed Buganda’s independence. Little effort, however, was made to make the claimed independence a reality.    Whether Buganda’s leaders believe in the kingdom’s independence from Uganda, or they simply use it as a bargaining chip against the central government is not clear. It is perhaps not clear even to Mengo, the seat of the kingdom, itself. What is clear is that demands for an independent Buganda feature prominently whenever there is a disagreement with the central government. Recently, separatist demands have been led by Makindye West MP, Hussein Kyanjo. Some senior Mengo officials, including the Deputy Katikkiro, Yusuf Nsubuga Nsambu, support him. “How can our things be taken as we simply look on? Why? I want to remind you that Buganda is a state in itself, which accepted to unite with other states to form Uganda with love. Now that that love is no more, why don’t we secede from Uganda so that we take our different directions?” he told The Observer recently, claiming that he was already looking for money to finance an independent Buganda. Nsambu had earlier attempted to table a motion calling for Buganda’s independence in the Lukiiko, but it was resisted by some in Mengo saying it would undermine talks between President Museveni and Kabaka Mutebi. BANYORO TO BANYALA The head of Makerere University’s Political Science Department, Dr. Yasin Olum, says both the 1966 crisis and the present tussle are about land. “In 1966, Mutesa said remove the capital from my soil, now the demand is over land, Kampala, its expansion. To me what transpired in 1966 is not different from what is happening now,” says Olum. The government has fronted plans to expand Kampala, the country’s capital, to parts of Wakiso, Mpigi and Mukono. Mengo has opposed the plans, seeing them as yet another attempt to weaken the kingdom by depriving it of its lands. Although Kampala is physically located in Buganda, it is not listed as part of Buganda in the constitution. Any expansion would be at the expense of the districts that are constitutionally recognised as being part of Buganda. Some analysts consider the loss of territory to Bunyoro in 1964 to be the turning point that led to the 1966 crisis. In his book General Amin (1978), Davin Martin says, for instance, that “writers on Uganda generally paid far too little attention to the ‘lost counties’ referendum as the crucial issue for Obote’s showdown with the Baganda in 1966…” In the referendum of November 1964, supported by Obote but opposed by Mengo, the counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi voted to return to Bunyoro. The two countries had been given to Buganda by the British colonialists as a reward for its support in their bid to subdue Bunyoro.   Although the independence constitution provided for a referendum on the “lost counties”, Buganda saw it as an attempt by Obote to weaken the kingdom. Makerere University history professor, Tanga Odoi, agrees, saying that Obote only supported the referendum opportunistically to gain Bunyoro’s support. “He never did it because he was a constitutional man,” says the historian. Buganda views President Museveni’s apparent support to ethnic groups trying to break away from Buganda, notably the Baruli and Banyala, in the same light. Indeed, it is government’s backing of the Banyala, who objected to Kabaka Mutebi’s visit to their area, that sparked off the September riots. FOREIGN HANDS Ronald Mutebi at the funeral of his father in 1971 Foreign involvement has also been cited in both the 1966 and 2009 crises. As the 1966 crisis built up, Kabaka Mutesa is alleged to have approached the British High Commission in Kampala, seeking military assistance. Obote also accused Mutesa of seeking help from Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. It is not clear whether the Kabaka sought help only to defend himself or move against Obote, or perhaps both. Whatever the truth of the allegations, they, together with the related claim that Mengo had acquired guns to overthrow the government, provided Obote with the ammunition he needed to attack the Kabaka’s palace (Look out for our report on whether there were illegal guns in Lubiri later in these series). Following the September riots, President Museveni made similar claims about foreign involvement. “I also got information that Mengo elements got foreign funds to further their aims of fighting the NRM and undermining the Constitution,” he told the nation on September 10. Fingers eventually pointed at Col. Muammar Gadaffi of Libya. Once Museveni’s ally, the two fell out mainly over their conflicting approaches to the question of a united Africa. Libya has maintained direct relations not only with Buganda, but also other kingdoms, bypassing the central government. THORNY LUKIIKO The nature of the Lukiiko has been a constant factor in conflicts between Buganda and the central government since 1953. Recounting events leading to his banishment in his book, Desecration of My Kingdom, Mutesa says the March 1953 increase of directly elected representatives to the Lukiiko to 60 out of the 89 members and three ministers escalated the conflict. The changes were opposed by the Lukiiko but supported by Mutesa. He wrote: “Not all the Lukiiko welcomed the new members as I did myself…That is not to say that the changes were unimportant. The more respectably democratic the Lukiiko became, the less the Governor could control or ignore it.” The debate on the composition of the Lukiiko rages on. President Museveni has on several occasions talked of imbalances in the Lukiiko, saying it is dominated by opposition leaders who lose elections. He argues that though it is a cultural institution, clan leaders are not represented in the Lukiiko. Although Museveni prefers an elected Lukiiko, Mengo insists on Lukiiko members nominated by the Kabaka. Mengo continues to oppose a compromise arrangement where there would be an elected Lukiiko dealing with political issues and an appointed one dealing with cultural issues. Mengo also rejects an elected Katikkiro. The Lukiiko wields significant power, sometimes prevailing upon the Katikkiro and even the Kabaka. Just as it opposed secret talks between Kabaka Mutesa and Governor Sir Andrew Cohen in 1953, the Lukiiko recently passed a resolution barring Kabaka Mutebi from holding direct talks with President Museveni.   It was the Lukiiko’s insistence on throwing Obote’s government out of Kampala against the advice of the Katikkiro, Jehoash Mayanja Nkangi that prompted Obote to invade the Lubiri on May 24, 1966. Nkangi himself had become the Katikkiro following the resignation of Michael Kintu under pressure from the Lukiiko and some Baganda, who blamed him for the loss of Buyaga and Bugangaizi to Bunyoro. Yet the Katikkiro’s tussles with the Lukiiko didn’t end with Nkangi. The current Katikkiro, Eng. J.B. Walusimbi faces similar ridicule before the Lukiiko and sections of Baganda. Walusimbi is accused by several Lukiiko members of being a pacifist, insisting on what they see as meaningless dialogue with the central government. In a recent Lukiiko meeting, Walusimbi was booed by some members when he claimed ignorance of the details of the recent Mutebi-Museveni meeting. Also, the Lukiiko wanted to pass a resolution condemning the continued closure of the kingdom’s radio, CBS, but this was resisted by Walusimbi. Walusimbi’s woes started on February 13, 2007, the day he was named Katikkiro, replacing the more belligerent Daniel Muliika. In what was seen as defiance of the Kabaka, who customarily has the last word on Buganda issues, groups of Baganda vigilantes opposed Muliika’s removal and camped at Bulange insisting that the Kabaka retains him. POLITICAL TOOL Both the government and the opposition have always sought to use Mengo and the Kabaka as a political tool. President Museveni has, for example, often accused the Kabaka of harbouring his political opponents. He accused the opposition, particularly Democratic Party spokesperson, Betty Nambooze of orchestrating the September riots. Earlier on July 18, Nambooze, who is also the chairperson of the Buganda Civic Education Committee, had been arrested, along with Buganda ministers Medard Lubega and Peter Mayiga, on accusations of “terrorism”. Nambooze and Lubega were eventually charged with “sedition” while Mayiga was released without any charges. The three had been strong critics of the Land Bill, which has since been passed by Parliament. State House is also said to have been behind the sacking of Daniel Muliika as Katikkiro. Apart from his confrontational approach, he was seen as being too close to the opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), in particular its then national chairman, Dr. Sulaiman Kiggundu. President Museveni’s insistence on an elected Katikkiro under the regional tier system, as opposed to one appointed by the Kabaka, is seen as a strategy to influence the choice of Katikkiro and have a counter-weight to the Kabaka in Buganda. Like Museveni, Obote tried to influence the appointment of Buganda officials in his favour. Historian Phares Mutibwa writes in his book Uganda Since Independence (1992) that “it was said at the time that Obote’s agents [in the Lukiiko] were instrumental in the choice and election of Mayanja-Nkangi as Katikkiro.” Obote similarly suspected his opponents, notably Minister of State and UPC Secretary General, Grace Ibingira, and Kabaka Yekka Secretary General, Daudi Ocheng, of trying to use Mengo to undermine his regime. Betty Nambooze may not be quite the Kabaka’s confidante that Daudi Ocheng was, but more parallels can be drawn between the two. Nambooze is as much a thorn in Museveni’s flesh as Ocheng was in Obote’s. Although Museveni blamed Nambooze for the September riots, she was bed-ridden at the time. She suspects poisoning by government agents. Ocheng’s widow, Namuli Ocheng, told The Observer that her husband was poisoned by elements in Obote’s government.   He, too, was bed-ridden in Mulago at the time of the 1966 attack on the Lubiri. He died shortly after on June 1, 1966. (Look out for Namuli Ocheng’s account of the 1966 crisis, and her take on the current tussle between Buganda and the government in forthcoming series). Much of the blame for the 1966 crisis, which is seen as the start of Uganda’s descent into political anarchy and civil conflicts, is laid on Milton Obote’s feet. However, the fact that he inherited the conflict between Buganda and the central government when he took the reins of power from the colonial government in 1962, and that the conflict continues almost 25 years after he left, suggests that he was not the sole culprit. While acknowledging Obote’s role, some analysts, such as Phares Mutibwa in his book Uganda Since Independence, have argued that Buganda and the Kabaka should take some of the blame for the 1966 crisis. “When [an authoritative account of the 1966 crisis] is written, his [Mutesa’s] role will certainly emerge as one among the most important, fatally so because in many ways Buganda’s disaster and indeed that of Uganda as a whole can be traced to the misguided leadership and unfortunate activities of Sir Edward himself and his lieutenants in Mengo,” he writes. President Museveni has been making a similar argument about the current standoff. Except, predictably, he does not concede any blame on the part of his government. It would, however, be inaccurate to view the current conflict as one purely between President Museveni and Kabaka Mutebi, or even between Buganda and the central government, says Mahmood Mamdani, a Ugandan Professor of Government at Harvard University in the United States. “Most Ugandans understand this as a democratic challenge, and not an ethnic one. This is why, unlike in 1966, today the Kabaka would be enthusiastically welcomed in all parts of Uganda were he to visit any of these,” he says. (Look out for Prof. Mamdani’s insights on the conflict later in the series). It is not Buganda’s search for “federo” at the heart of the conflict anymore but rather, Uganda’s search for democratic governance. It makes the stakes all the higher.

Who fears Federalism? (Mao’s speech at Buganda Conference, 09)

Gentlemen and ladies,
This was one of the speeches at 2009 Buganda Conference held at Hotel
Africana in Kampala.

More will come.

Who fears Federalism? A Case for Federalism in Uganda

By Norbert Mao

At the outset let me congratulate the Kingdom of Buganda for
organising this national conference. I feel honoured to have been
selected out of 31 million Ugandans to speak on a theme which is
timely and relevant. My presence and the presence of a variety of
speakers and participants shows the national charcter and seriousness
of this debate. The theme is inclusive and flies in the face of those
who have accused Buganda of selfishness. Buganda’s selfishness if
any is seasonal and only asserted at those moments when the survival
of Buganda as an entity is in danger.

This conference is timely because we need a new consensus on how to
govern ourselves as Ugandans. We need a consensus based on democracy
and respect for diversity. We need a consensus that compels the
government to be accountable. We need a consensus based on Truth and
Justice. We need a consensus that recognises that change and
continuity go together. Out previous attempts at national consensus
have largely been unsuccessful. The historical record is there for all
to see. Wasn’t the consensus crafted on the eve of independence
brutally demolished in 1966 – before some of us were born? Wasn’t
the post-Amin consensus trampled over by a capricious and malevolent
clique which masterminded the disputed elections of 1980? isn’t the
consensus crafted in the bushes of Luwero (the birthplace of the NRM)
for all intents and purposes dead? We need a new consensus. The great
expectations aroused by the ascendancy of the NRM into state power
have been met with treachery and betrayal.

This is not the time for lamenting over the mistakes of past. We
cannot change the past but we can learn from it. If we cannot pick up
the pieces let us pick up the lessons and move on. It is important to
learn from history but we must not become perennial prisoners of
history.

Politics, it is said, is the gentle art of getting support from
perceived rival groups by promising to protect each from the others.
In Uganda the eve of independence saw the ill-fated alliance of KY and
UPC whose glue was a common fear of the Catholics. In 1980, the UPC
galvanised support by promising to protect the country from a
resurgent Buganda. In Gulu the UPC leaders told the public that if
they make the mistake of electing Dr. Ssemogerere, they will be forced
to carry bricks and stones all the way to Kampala to rebuild the
Lubiri which had been ransacked in 1966.

This trend of using fear rather than hope has continued. The NRM has
circled the political wagon in the South of the country by dangling
the so called Northern bogeyman at every election. The horrors of our
violent history are deeply etched in our national psyche and these are
the scars that are manipulated to lock out potential leaders and
groups associated with them. This is what happened on the eve of
independence.

The NRM rhetoric has been the rhetoric of divide and rule. The NRM had
endeared itself to most of the South by claiming that it’s mission is
to prevent the Northerners from returning to power. It is true that
many political and military leaders originating from the North bear
responsibility for certain atrocities visited upon innocent people,
and it is right that we should not just sweep things under the carpet.
But we should not get paralysed by our memory. We should remember
these horrors. But we should do better than just remembering. We
should overcome and rise above our dark past.

I believe in individual responsibility for individual crimes. I don’t
believe in impunity. But something in my soul rebels against the
politics of assigning collective responsibility upon an entire ethnic
group for crimes committed by individuals.

We do not choose our tribes. I did not fill an application form to
become an Acholi. I detest being judged on the basis of my ethnic
origin. Above all I know that all ethnic groups have bad people and
good people. Virtue is not a monopoly of a particular ethnic group and
neither is evil.

In the North, we feel besieged by the post 1986 politics of heaping
the collective guilt for all the historical wrongs upon the people of
Northern Uganda.

Yet the record is different. There are bright moments in our common
history. In times of danger, faced with colonial repression our
traditional leaders have always sought refuge with their allies.
History is full of these examples.

Furthermore it is the core of Ugandans from all corners of this
country that laid the foundation for the development of Uganda. Let us
not play politics with history. Ugandans from South, East, West and
North have contributed to nation building.

If anything, we are currently witnessing highly destructive tendencies
where terror is projected as security, manipulation is projected as
politics and corruption is projected as enterprise. Between 1962 and
1985 Uganda received about 2.2 billion US Dollars in loans and grants.
Between 1986 and 2008 Uganda received 22 billion US Dollars in loans
and grants. In which period do we have more to show in terms of public
investments for the money received?

In the wake of privatization (some call it grabatization) some 150
enterprises were put up for sale. We were told that Uganda would earn
900 billion shillings from the sale. My research has shown that after
selling 145 enterprises, the privatization process had instead cost
more than it had earned. The accounts showed a deficit of 16.5 billion
shillings!

I bring these examples to show that politics is about ensuring good
stewardship of public assets. I bring these examples to show that we
have to reexamine our history and find out where we made the wrong
turns. It is going to be tough but we have no choice.

There are many prescriptions for the New Uganda. I can only speak
about the prescriptions put forward by the party to which I belong –
the Democratic Party. The 2006 Democratic Party platform stated that
“…several features of the constitution have proven weak and
inappropriate. The question of federalism and the structure of local
governments have not been resolved by the new regional administration
set up”.

In Northern Uganda, the misery brought about by war and the
realization that the region has most of Uganda’s arable land and lots
of mineral wealth including oil, has led to a debate about what system
of government can give the people a fair deal. Even the talk about
secession and the fictitious Nile State is all part of the quest for
greater regional autonomy.

Federalism is being considered seriously as the highest form of
decentralization. There are four main reasons why federalism is
considered more attractive. First, it devolves power to the people.
Second, it takes services closer to the people. Third, it
democratizes society, and fourth, it provides an additional layer of
checks and balances thus deepening democracy.

The unitary system of government has failed Uganda and is party
responsible for the zero-sum politics which has turned our politics
into a life and death struggle for the capture of power which largely
lies at the centre. Changing the underlying system of governance
through federalism will help solve the persistent social, political
and economic problems that afflict our country. Federalism will deal
with corruption, restore the prestige of government institutions and
bring redress for imbalances in economic prosperity.

In answer to the demands for greater regional autonomy, the government
has come up with the proposal for regional tiers. The purpose of this
is not to devolve more power to regions and to democratize the centre
but rather to deal with the controversy arising out of the never
ending demand for federalism especially from Buganda. The proposed
regional tier is thus a pain killer intended to provide temporary
relief for those clamoring for greater regional autonomy. In a way
the government is trying to treat a cancer using Vaseline.

What is being proposed is “interior decoration”. What we need is a
change in “architecture”. Cosmetic changes will simply not do.
They only postpone the day of reckoning – the moment of truth when
the pillars of lies that are holding up the NRM will collapse in a
heap of dust.

Buganda is central to this struggle for federalism because the story
of Uganda’s politics is largely the story of the ups and downs of the
relationship between Buganda and the central authorities that have
ruled Uganda.

In his 1993 book, Religion, Ethnicity and Politics in Uganda, Prof.
Dan Mudoola wrote: “The 1900 Agreement was the “Magna Carta” for
Buganda and its ruling groups. The ruling groups wove myths around
this document. Among such was that the Agreement had been between two
equal contracting parties and that Buganda had never been conquered.
Although these myths have been disputed, the most important point is
that the Agreement served the interests of the colonial power and the
ruling groups in Buganda and that it set the pace for subsequent
political developments in Buganda and eventually, Uganda.”

Yet the 1900 Buganda Agreement was clearly creating an unequal
relationship. Listen to this passage in the Agreement: “So long as
the Kabaka, Chiefs and people of Uganda shall conform to the laws and
regulations constituted for their governance by Her Majesty’s
government and shall cooperate loyally with Her Majesty’s government
in the organization and administration of the said Kingdom of Uganda,
Her Majesty’s Government agrees to recognize the Kabaka of Buganda as
the native Ruler of the province of Uganda under Her Majesty’s
protection and overrule.”

In 1901 limited agreements were made with Ankole and Toro. In 1933 an
agreement was made with Bunyoro. For the rest of the administrative
units, later named districts, there were no formal agreements. The
colonial powers made ordinances defining the powers and obligations of
the chiefs. Thus the stage was set for the paternalistic relationship
between the centre and the localities.

With that background, we are now at that stage where we have to ask
the right questions in order to get the right answers: Who fears
Federalism? Who fears an overbearing central government? Who fears
strong sub-national governments? We have to deal with these fears. We
in Northern Uganda do not fear Federalism. Don’t count us among those
who fear Federalism.

In order to make the case for Federalism we have to start from the
premise that decentralization is necessary but not sufficient.
Federalism has been defined as an arrangement where the central
government draws its authority from the consent of the people in the
localities – not through elections but through the constitutional
delegation of limited decision making power. In other words, it is
the localities to decide what the centre is permitted. In our current
arrangement, it is the centre to decide what the localities are
permitted!

So currently the localities are told to collect the taxes that are
most difficult to collect – local service tax, hotel tax. We need
localities that can also benefit from a portion of VAT and sales
taxes. That is where the real money is.

Let’s face it; Federalism actually draws power away from the centre.
It gives more power to second tier governments whether they be
Kingdoms, States, or regions.

What is the problem with the current arrangement?

Let’s start with the economics: What we have now is nominal
decentralization. That is why most districts are not financially
viable. This situation exists even after 15 years of
decentralization. The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) is the alpha and
omega of any serious tax collection. Taxation largely begins and ends
with URA.

All local governments depend on transfers from the central
government. Even the most basic expenditures like the cost of
administration cannot be funded by local revenue. Under the current
arrangement, the local governments are dependent on the centre for
survival. To use a well worn phrase, if the centre sneezes, the
districts catch a cold.

One possible exception to this, potentially, is Buganda. The fact
that Kampala and other major urban centres are located in Buganda,
allows Buganda to benefit from concentrated political and economic
activity. Buganda would thus be in a class of its own under any
system that allows more power to sub-national governments. Note that
I use the word ‘allow’ rather than ‘give’. This power is already
there, only that the current constitutional arrangement prevents the
regions from exercising them.

Another problem of the current arrangement is lack of institutional
capacity. This problem is most glaring in the new districts and at
the sub-county and parish levels. Currently, local governments have
budgetary power but lack the resources to meaningfully exercise that
authority.

Any arrangement that leaves the revenue shortfalls intact will only
create ineffective local governments. Ineffectiveness comes with
political consequences. Currently all the blame goes to the central
government or the districts. If we create ineffective local
governments, whether second tier regional governments or federal
units, the blame for non delivery of services will shift to these units.

Our current political climate also deserves careful study. As 2011
approaches, there is a clamor by various individuals and parties to
seize control of state power. The question is, do these individuals
and parties seek to seize the government in order to restructure it or
do they want to wield power without changing the current
constitutional architecture.

Besides the politicians, the cultural leaders/traditional leaders and
the traditional institutions are also in vigorous negotiations with
the government. The aim of these negotiations seem to be not to
change the system but to get as much as possible under the current
system.

But if we agree that the current system does not work, then our common
agenda should be to tear down the current arrangement instead of
seeking to take charge of it the way it is. If we want genuine
federalism, we need a fresh start. We cannot build any kind of
federalism on the shaky foundations of the current constitutional
arrangement. We need a new beginning. Horse trading and wheeling and
dealing will simply lead to the same old vicious cycle of betrayals
and broken promises. Only a fresh start, a new consensus can remove
the economic and political stumbling blocks on the path to real
federalism as opposed to what is popularly known as “ebyoya
by’enswa”.

If we want real federalism, we must not aspire to take the current
undemocratic power structure at the centre and reproduce it at the
local levels. If federalism is about deepening democracy, then power
in the federal units should not be concentrated in a few hands. In
other words, the people should govern. At the risk of sounding
cynical, let me say that before decentralization, we had one
unaccountable government at the centre. Decentralization has now
created many unaccountable governments.

The demand for Federalism must grow from below. To expect a central
government which is obsessed with concentrating power at the centre to
lead the quest for federalism is to expect a hyena to abandon its
appetite for meat. The Uganda government will not limit its own
power. Checking unbridled power at the centre is the most critical
political endeavour in Uganda today and it must be spearheaded from
the grassroots.

Everything that is created is created in the image of the creator.
Even God created man in His own image. To permit the central
government to spearhead the federalism debate comes with the risk of
the debate being hijacked by individuals who see federalism as a
threat to their hold on power. They thus join the debate so as to
create a federalism in their own image.

Federalism is the answer to the concentration of power. As
federalists, our challenge is to lead by example. Let us walk our
talk. Let us ensure local devolution in our own localities. This is
the only way we can show that we are different from the power hungry
clique at the centre. Let us show our commitment not to duplicate the
undemocratic and authoritarian structures at the centre under the
pretext of federalism. Let us reject totalitarianism by any name and
at any level.

This approach is in our interest. Unless our demand for federalism is
built on a foundation of democracy and cooperation rather than
hegemony and rivalry, we shall only have local dictatorships each
jostling with others. This will play into the hands of the powers
that be at the centre. The centre will then come in as a mediator of
conflicts. This is what happened in what I would call the Kayunga
Circus. The central government opportunistically increased its power
as the arbiter of an artificial conflict.

In conclusion, let it be known from today, here and now that the quest
for Federalism in Uganda is national. It is not a Buganda affair. Let
it also be known that the primary problem of Uganda is dictatorship.
The other problems are secondary. Tribalism, corruption, xenophobia,
militarism, are all children of dictatorship. They are tools deployed
by a dictatorship as means of survival.

Today we must draw the line and say Enough is Enough. I call upon all
of us to put our brains, our energies and yes, our votes, together to
dismantle the edifice of dictatorship that is blocking our way to a
better future. The answer to Uganda’s problems is democracy – genuine
democracy. Even the demand for federalism is because federalism
deepens democracy.

Let us not leave this place contented that we have had a fantastic
conference. Let us leave this place with a resolve to struggle in
solidarity against dictatorship. And so your brother, your sister your
friend is not just the one who speaks your language but one who is
fighting dictatorship and offering a democratic system based on Truth
and Justice. It will take sacrifice. We may get killed. We may be
tortured. We may be imprisoned. But as the Baganda say “engabu
y’omuzira ogilabira ku biwundu”.

I believe that this country can rise above it’s dark past. What we
need is determination, hard work and unity of purpose. The answer to
power is power. We cannot borrow power, we have to create it. We have
to discover it in ourselves.

As Frederick Douglass the famous anti-slavery campaigner said:
“Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never
will. Find out just what any people will quietly submit to and you
have found out the exact measure of injustice and wrong which will be
imposed upon them, and these will continue till they are resisted with
either words or blows, or both. The limits of tyrants are prescribed
by the endurance of those whom they oppress.”

Broadcasting Council tells Kalundi serumaga to ‘shut up’ after being tortured in prison

Prince Junju’s mother,Venetia Sebudandi(Future Namasole) is a Rwandese

GOVERNOR COHEN TO KABAKA MUTESA II, 27 OCT 1953: WAKE UP!

“Moreover the separation of Buganda from the rest of the Protectorate might well be objected to by some sections of the public in Buganda and particularly the minorities, and might even lead in the case of the minori­ties to requests for separation from Buganda.”

“If the Protectorate were to be divided into separate parts, each of these parts would be much weaker economically and in every other way than the Protectorate as a whole; and not only much weaker, but much less able to hold its own in dealings with the neighbouring territories.”

“A strong and united Protectorate rather than weak separate units must therefore be the aim of all our efforts in the interests both present and future of the people of the Protectorate.”

“Buganda geographically lies at the centre of the Protectorate and economically and in other ways its affairs are completely bound up with those of the Protectorate as a whole. These economic and general ties, reinforced by Buganda’s geographical posi­tion, have been built up over many years and,…..it would be virtually impossible now to break them down.”

Entebbe

27 October 1953.

To: HRH Kabaka Mutesa 11,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of the 6th August regarding the relations of the Uganda Protectorate with the other East African terri­tories and to inform you that I duly referred this letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies as soon as it was received. I subsequently discussed the contents of the letter with Your Highness and your Ministers and during my recent visit to London I discussed the matter with the Secretary of State.

2. The Secretary of State has instructed me to inform you that he has considered your letter with the greatest care and that he fully realizes from its contents and from what I have myself told him the strength of feeling on the part of the people of Buganda on the subject of Federation. Your letter and recent expressions of public opinion in Buganda reveal fears and suspicions about the intentions of Her Majesty’s Government in this matter; the purpose of this reply which the Secretary of State has instructed me to convey to Your Highness is to dispel these fears and suspicions and to convince Your Highness and your Ministers, and the people of Bug­anda, that they are groundless. The Secretary of State attaches the greatest importance to removing these fears and suspicions and he has asked me, as Governor, to do everything in my power to achieve this object.

3. The reply which the Secretary of State has instructed me to make, on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government to the points raised in Your High­ness’ letter falls into four parts. It deals first with past statements on the subject of federation; secondly it contains a further statement by Her Majesty’s Government on this subject: while the third and fourth parts of the reply comment on your request that responsibility for Buganda affairs should be transferred from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office and your request for the separation of Buganda from the rest of the Protec­torate.

4. Past statements on the subject of federation made by or on the instructions of Ministers of Her Majesty’s Government have been examined and it has been found that no statement has been made in the past ruling out the possibility of federation for all time. The statement in the letter of the 18th March, 1922, quoted by Your Highness, which was repeated in 1924, specifically referred to the possibility of federation of the East African territories, and it is clear from all the discussions which followed up to 1931, when H.M. Government decided on the advice of the Joint Select Committee of the two Houses of Parliament not to proceed with the matter at that time, that this possibility included the Uganda Pro­tectorate. East African federation, including Uganda, was being actively discussed in 1931, when a deputation from Uganda, including Mr. S. W. Kulubya, went to London to give evidence on this subject to the Joint Select Committee.

5. No further statements on the subject are on record until 1945, when proposals were put forward, in paper Colonial 191, for the establishment of an East Africa High Commission and Assembly to deal with certain common services of interest to all three East African territories, in the spheres particularly of communications and research. Colonial 191 stated in paragraph 9 that the proposals then made involved ‘neither political closer union nor the fusion of the East African Governments’, and gave as the reason for this in paragraph 10 that ‘H.M. Government in the United Kingdom have accordingly come to the conclusion after taking the advice of the East African Governors that political federation or fusion in any of the various forms which have been discussed in the last twenty years is not practical politics under existing conditions’. In his statement to Parliament of the 28th July, 1947, Mr. Creech-Jones, in announcing that it had been decided to implement the proposals in the subsequent paper Colonial 210, said: ‘The scheme is not to be regarded as a step towards political union or the fusion of the East African Governments.’ Mr. Griffiths in his statement to the Great Lukiko on the 15th May, 1951, said that the statement that the present inter-territorial organization did not involve the political union of the East African territories still held good. Your Highness will observe that none of these statements ruled out federa­tion for all time and I am instructed in particular to draw your attention to the use of the phrase ‘not practical politics under existing conditions’ in paragraph 10 of the Colonial 191.

6. In my letter of the 27th July, I informed Your Highness, on instruc­tions from the Secretary of State, that as regards the present intentions of Her Majesty’s Government the Secretary of State’s speech did not indi­cate any change of policy on the part of Her Majesty’s Government; that the future development of Uganda and the other East African territories must be largely guided by local public opinion; and that the assurance which I gave to the Great Lukiko in my speech of the 23rd April, 1952, still holds good. I also said in my public statement of the 11th August, again on the instructions of the Secretary of State, that ‘there should not be read into the Secretary of State’s speech any intention on the part of H.M. Government at the present time to raise the issue of East African federation’. In the view of the Secretary of State this assurance, so far from falling short of past assurances, in fact went somewhat further in that, in addition to ruling out federation at the present time, it stated that future developments must be largely guided by local opinion. It appears to the Secretary of State that you may not have fully appreciated the im­portance of this part of the statement in my letter of the 27th July. But, in view of the terms of Your Highness’s letter, the Secretary of State has decided that it is necessary to amplify the statement and make it more definite. I am accordingly instructed to inform you as follows.

7. Her Majesty’s Government has no intention whatsoever of raising the issue of East African federation either at the present time or while local public opinion on this issue remains as it is at the present time. Her Majesty’s Government fully recognizes that public opinion in Buganda and the rest of the Protectorate would be opposed to the inclusion of the Uganda Protectorate in any such federation; Her Majesty’s Government has no intention whatsoever of disregarding this opinion either now or at any time, and recognizes accordingly that the inclusion of the Uganda Protectorate in any such federation is outside the realm of practical politics at the present time or while local public opinion remains as it is at the present time. As regards the more distant future, Her Majesty’s Government clearly cannot state now that the issue of East African federa­tion will never be raised, since public opinion in the Protectorate, includ­ing that of the Baganda, might change, and it would not in any case be proper for Her Majesty’s Government to make any statement now which might be used at some time in the future to prevent effect being given to the wishes of the people of the Protectorate at that time. But Her Majesty’s Government can and does say that unless there is a substantial change in public opinion in the Protectorate, including that of the Baganda, the inclusion of the Protectorate in an East African federation will remain outside the realm of practical politics even in the more distant future. The Secretary of State is confident that you will agree that in this statement he has gone as far as he possibly can and has given you safeguards which cannot fail to be regarded as satisfactory.

8. Having given the firm assurances contained in the preceding para­graph, the Secretary of State feels sure that you need have no further fears on the question of federation. Nevertheless he thinks that you will wish him to comment on the suggestions put forward in paragraphs 10 and 11 of your letter. He does not propose to comment on the remarks about Central Africa in paragraph 7 of your letter, but this must not be taken as meaning that he accepts these remarks.

9. The Secretary of State has asked me to say that your request for transfer of responsibility for the affairs of Buganda to the Foreign Office is evidently based on a misunderstanding. The Foreign Office is respon­sible for the relations of Her Majesty’s Government with foreign countries outside the British Commonwealth. The Colonial Office deals with the affairs of territories inside the British Commonwealth for which Her Majesty’s Government is responsible, whether they be Colonies, Pro­tectorates, Protected States or Trust Territories. Your Highness has sug­gested in paragraph 6 of your letter that Buganda is a Protected State under Her Majesty’s Government; but this is not correct in the accepted constitutional sense of the term. Under the terms of the 1900 Agreement Buganda is clearly stated to rank as a province forming part of the Uganda Protectorate (Article 3), a position which has recently been reaffirmed in the joint statement on reforms in Buganda issued by Your Highness and myself last March. Not only Article 3 but other articles made it clear that Buganda was to be merged both fiscally and legislatively into the Protec­torate as a whole, and this in fact has been done. The whole tenor of the Agreement made it clear that Buganda was to be part of the Protectorate. Your Highness has referred in paragraph 9 of your letter to the 1894 Agreement as well as the 1900 Agreement. The Secretary of State is ad­vised that it is the 1900 Agreement which must be regarded as the pre­vailing document and the instrument regulating the relations between Her Majesty’s Government and Buganda. The Agreement was freely entered into and has ever since its signature been accepted both by H.M. Government, and by the Buganda Government and people as the document defining their relations with each other.

10. Even were Buganda a Protected State, which constitutionally it is not, its affairs would still be dealt with on behalf of Her Majesty’s Govern­ment by the Colonial Office, as those of other Protected States within the British Commonwealth are. Your Highness has claimed in paragraph 6 of your letter that the transfer of responsibility for Buganda from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office in 1902 involved a reduction of status; but this is not correct. As has already been stated, the 1900 Agreement clearly laid it down that Buganda should be administered as part of the Uganda Protectorate. In these circumstances there could have been no alternative but to transfer responsibility to the Colonial Office, a step which in any case logically followed once Buganda came under the protection of H.M. Government.

11. Furthermore the Secretary of State has asked me to point out that, even if it were appropriate to transfer responsibility for Buganda to the Foreign Office, which constitutionally it is not, this would not alter the position regarding federation at all. As far as Her Majesty’s Government is concerned it is not any particular Government department or Minister who decides major constitutional issues of the importance of federation in the territories for which Her Majesty’s Government is responsible, whether in East Africa or elsewhere; such major decisions can only be taken by Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom as a whole, where necessary with the approval of Parliament. It follows that, since Buganda is under the protection of Her Majesty’s Government, it would make no difference as regards federation whether it were dealt with by the Colonial Office or some other department, since the ultimate decision on this matter could only be taken by Her Majesty’s Government as a whole. Therefore it is clear first that this request cannot constitutionally be acceded to and secondly that even if it could be this would not achieve what Your Highness has in mind.

12. In paragraph 11 of your letter Your Highness has asked that a plan should be put into effect designed to achieve the independence of Buganda. It is not clear to the Secretary of State from your letter exactly what is meant by ‘independence’; but I reported the subsequent discussions which I had with yourself and your Ministers and the Secretary of State under­stands that you are not asking to go outside the Commonwealth – the wording of the first sentence of paragraph 11 indeed implies that you are not asking this. The Secretary of State also understands that you have informed me during the course of the discussions that Buganda has no wish to leave the protection of Britain. The Secretary of State in fact understands that you were seeking, without leaving the protection of Her Majesty’s Government, to safeguard Buganda against the possibility of East African federation in the future, either by separating Buganda now from the rest of the Protectorate or at any rate by removing Buganda from the jurisdiction of the Protectorate Legislative Council.

13. The Secretary of State asks me to say that he is glad that Your Highness does not wish Buganda to leave the protection of Britain because he is sure that this would not be to the advantage of the people of Buganda. Your Highness will no doubt agree that the Baganda have received many benefits from British protection and that the association between the Baganda and the British people has been fruitful over the years and con­tinues to be so. You will also, the Secretary of State is sure, agree that, apart from the many benefits received by the Baganda in the past, there have recently been very significant advances. In the political field there are the reforms announced earlier in the year, under which the people of Buganda will play a greater part in their system of government and the Buganda Government will be given substantial increased responsibilities for the operation of certain services in Buganda. In the economic field important benefits have been brought to the Baganda by the work of the Protectorate Agricultural and Veterinary Departments for the improve­ment of agriculture and cattle-keeping; by the expansion of the co­operative movement through the efforts of the Protectorate Department of Co-operative Development; and by the cotton and coffee reorganiza­tion schemes. In the field of education, to which so much importance is rightly attached by your people, the Protectorate has embarked on a great programme of expansion both of general and technical education which will greatly benefit the Baganda, while Makerere College is con­tinuing to expand, again to their great advantage. All these are benefits which have been brought to Buganda through its association with Britain and through action on a Protectorate-wide basis. The Secretary of State is therefore sure that Your Highness is right both from the point of view of the present interests of the Baganda and their future interests not to wish to leave British protection.

14. The points which require to be considered, therefore, are whether it would be possible or desirable in the interests of Buganda and its people, and whether it would affect the position regarding federation, either to separate Buganda from the rest of the Protectorate or to remove it from the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council. I have informed the Secretary of State that in discussion with me Your Highness has recognized that both these steps would involve amendment of the 1900 Agreement, since the Agreement lays down in Article 3 that Buganda ranks as a province of the Protectorate and in Article 5 that the laws made for the general government of the Protectorate are applicable to Buganda except in so far as they may be in conflict with the Agreement. Before discussing these suggestions in detail, the Secretary of State feels bound to say that he is surprised that they should have been put forward so soon after you had joined with me in stating at the end of our joint statement on the reforms in Buganda that ‘the Uganda Protectorate has been and will continue to be developed as a unitary state. The Kingdom of Buganda will continue to go forward under the government of His Highness the Kabaka and play its part, in accordance with Clause 3 of the Agreement, as a Province and a component part of the Protectorate.’

15. As regards separation from the Protectorate, the Secretary of State seriously doubts whether this would be practicable, even if it were desirable in the interests of your people. Buganda geographically lies at the centre of the Protectorate and economically and in other ways its affairs are completely bound up with those of the Protectorate as a whole. These economic and general ties, reinforced by Buganda’s geographical posi­tion, have been built up over many years and, in the Secretary of State’s view, it would be virtually impossible now to break them down.

16. Nor does he consider that this would be in the interests of the Baganda. In recent years they have been playing an increasing part in the economic life of the country as a whole and they are now entering industries which are established on a Protectorate-wide basis. Your people, with a longer experience of organized government than many of the rest of the people of the Protectorate, are well fitted to play an increasing part in public life on a Protectorate-wide basis and are in fact doing so. If Buganda, while remaining under British protection, were to be separ­ated from the rest of the Protectorate, Her Majesty’s Government would of course continue to do its best to help the Baganda develop in the political, economic and social spheres. But this would be infinitely more difficult if Buganda were separated from the rest of the Protectorate than it is now. The Secretary of State is convinced that such a separation would gravely upset the economic stability of the country; would seri­ously interfere with schemes for the economic development of the Baganda and other Africans in the Protectorate which are now being actively carried forward; would reduce the amounts of money available for development and for the advancement of the people; and in a word would completely disrupt all that is now being done to help the Baganda forward. The Secretary of State is certain, therefore, that such a separation would be prejudicial to the present and future interests of the Baganda. Moreover the separation of Buganda from the rest of the Protectorate might well be objected to by some sections of the public in Buganda and particularly the minorities, and might even lead in the case of the minori­ties to requests for separation from Buganda.

17. On the question of taking Buganda out of the purview of the Legislative Council, while retaining it within the Protectorate, this, in the Secretary of State’s view, would be seriously damaging to Buganda‘s interests. There are many laws of great and sometimes of vital importance to the Baganda which could not be passed by the Lukiko because they affect not only the Baganda but also Europeans and Asians. Notable examples of these are the cotton and coffee reorganization laws; but there are many other examples. If Buganda were taken out of the purview of the Legislative Council laws such as these would have to be applied to Buganda by the Governor by proclamation, and there would be no opportunity, such as is provided by the Legislative Council, for members representing Buganda to take part in the discussion of them, speaking for the interests of the Baganda. Such a situation would be detrimental to the interests of Buganda and would give the Baganda legitimate grounds for complaint that their views were not being properly put forward. In the Secretary of State’s view, therefore, it would be wrong to take Buganda out of the purview of the Legislative Council. Indeed the Secretary of State would go further than that and say that the members from Buganda ought to be selected by the Lukiko rather than nominated, seeing that this would link the members with the people whom they represent.

18. It remains to discuss how the separation of Buganda from the Protectorate, or its removal from the purview of the Legislative Council, would affect the position regarding federation. It is evident from what Your Highness has said to myself in discussing this matter that you fear that the Legislative Council could of its own act bring Buganda into a federation; but the Secretary of State has asked me to point out that this is not so. So long as Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom is ultimately responsible for the administration of the East African terri­tories, any scheme of federation which might be put forward could only come into force with the approval of Her Majesty’s Government; with Buganda under British protection this would apply whether Buganda was separated from the Protectorate or not. Her Majesty’s Government would of course take into account the views of the Legislative Council of the Protectorate; but would also take into account the views of the Buganda Government. Separating Buganda from the rest of the Protectorate or taking it outside the purview of the Legislative Council would not there­fore alter the position regarding federation – a position that is in any case safeguarded by the assurances conveyed to Your Highness in paragraph 7 of this letter. In so far as it would affect the situation at all, taking Buganda outside the purview of the Legislative Council would weaken rather than strengthen the position of the Baganda in this matter; for the Legislative Council, with its substantial number of African members, would provide an important mouthpiece for the expression of African opinion should this matter ever be raised. With Buganda members on the Legislative Council, these would have full opportunity to express the views held by the Baganda on this subject; but if they were not on the Legislative Coun­cil this opportunity would be lost.

19. For all these reasons the Secretary of State does not agree that the separation of Buganda from the rest of the Protectorate or its removal from the purview of the Legislative Council would be in the interests, either present or future, of the Baganda; nor would either of these steps alter the position regarding federation. The Secretary of State has instructed me strongly to advise Your Highness that the proper course is not to suggest breaking up the Protectorate into separate parts, but to strengthen its unity and to work for its future political, economic and social develop­ment. If the Protectorate were to be divided into separate parts, each of these parts would be much weaker economically and in every other way than the Protectorate as a whole; and not only much weaker, but much less able to hold its own in dealings with the neighbouring territories. A strong and united Protectorate rather than weak separate units must therefore be the aim of all our efforts in the interests both present and future of the people of the Protectorate.

Andrew Benjamin Cohen

Governor

Can sue KCC, Ministry of Works, Local Governments

Why haven’t the laws and statutes on law books, not been implemented? Is it intentional murder and destruction of Baganda? The above laws are intended to protect the people why are they not implemented? All laws below have direct implications, Baganda welfare and health but why haven’t they been implemented? Who ask that question and below are the laws:

1.   Physical Planning laws;

–    The Country and Urban Planning Act 1964,2000

–    A poorly written Local Government Act 1997

2.   Water Act (surface, underground), nwsc

3.   Environmental Act (air, water, soil, atmosphere), nema

4.   Forest Act (green belts, forested areas), national forest authority

5.   Land Act

6.   Building Act (temporary and permanent buildings), kcc

7.   Public Health Act. kcc and ministry of health

8.   Traffic Act. Ministry Transport and Works

9.   Electricity Act 1964 (power lines, networks/installations) ueb aka, umeme, uetcl, uedlc …

1. Communication Act (telephony and internet networks/installations) uptl aka ucc, posta, utl

KampalaNRM.JPG 100K   View Download

nrm-3.JPG 57K   View Download

nrm-4.JPG 53K   View Download

NRMupe.JPG 22K   View Download

Nyendo.JPG 27K   View Download

Whatever Eats Buganda, Eats Bunyoro Too.

Kalundi Serumaga

kalundi@yahoo.com

Nigerian author Chinua Achebe tells us of a proverb questioning the judgement of a man who, while fighting a fire consuming his house, drops his bucket to chase the rats fleeing from the same flames.

There are perhaps those who could defend such behaviour. May be the rats has been disturbing the poor man’s sleep for many years, and he decided that this was the only real opportunity to get rid of them for once and for all. After all, a house burned to the ground can be rebuilt, but a night of lost sleep can never really be replaced.

The multi-headed leadership of Bunyoro reflects this dilemma of prioritising: what should be of importance right now? Reclaiming land lost in the past to the emergent Buganda Kingdom, or focussing on the oil resource of the future, that the central government is drilling on the land they do have left?

“Stephen was the first martyr in the Bible. Much as I am also Stephen, I don’t wish to become such a martyr. I think I am more useful to my people alive than dead”.

These words came from Hon. Stephen Mukitale Birahwa MP on September 18^th , at a parliamentary press conference where he spoke of the existence of a land-buying “mafia” that was unfairly gobbling up all the possible oilfield sites in his oil-rich Buliisa constituency. He was explaining that the members of this alleged mafia were too dangerous to mentioned by name.

This is not the first time that he had felt himself in danger while defending his constituents land interests. Readers may remember him as the MP who was assaulted by herdsmen, whom the police then refused to arrest, during the Bunyoro “balaalo” saga.

Perhaps all this would not be so alarming, save for the fact that Hon. Birahwa is a leading voice in the ruling NRM party, and chairs the Parliamentary Committee on The National Economy. If he does not feel safe, who can?

In his book, “Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil” the British journalist Stephen Shaxson recounts how the “oil curse” has swept across Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Angola and Nigeria, leaving nothing but misery, inequality and intractable conflicts behind.

One common factor is how those controlling the oil industry often resort to promoting ethnic conflicts as a way of distracting their citizens from demanding more open, and democratic arrangements in the drilling and distribution of oil revenues.

Up until now, most of the oilfields on the Bunyoro area have been located inside national parks and other such gazetted areas, making them conceptually “off-limits” to the natives of Bunyoro, as such areas “belong” to central government.

Buganda’s nationalists have argued that resources located in a given region belong, first and foremost, to the indigenes found there, to be shared -on their terms- with the rest of the country. They have encouraged Bunyoro to demand transparency on the issues how much oil there is regardless of location. After all, even the national parks were carved out of Bunyoro’s land, initially as punishment for their rebelliousness.

Instead Bunyoro’s various voices (the Kingdom government, the Mubende-Bunyoro Committee, the Bunyoro-blessed Baruuli and Banyala), have sought to chase the rats in the form of land lost to Buganda over the last two and a half centuries The question as to why they do not press such claims on land similarly lost to Busoga, Lango, Toro and Ankole is never directly answered. Meanwhile, the oil wells get deeper and their lands are threatened, as Hon. Birahwa’s claims show.

The argument for native ownership rights has been dismissed as “backward”, “sectarian” thinking typical of Third World “tribalists”. It can certainly appear so, when it seems to come from one quarter only. However, as Hon. Beti Kamya’s Uganda Federalist Alliance NGO has argued, there is no part of this country without considerable mineral and other wealth. The only challenges are open declaration, responsible exploitation and revenue distribution.

However, an example from that other well-known backward Third World country called the United States of America, may help.

In the largest land claims settlement in US history, then President Richard Nixon signed into law the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act on December 18, 1971. Despite having already physically purchased Alaska from the Russian Empire over century earlier, making it one of its federal states, the US government was still compelled to resolve long-standing land claims from the indigenous native Alaskan (“Eskimo”) tribes.

The effect of the Act was to create 12 native regional and 200 village corporations in the names of the tribes, and then transfer some 601,000 square kilometers (about 149, 000, 000 acres) from the the control of the US federal government to them. In addition, the natives were paid some $962,000,000, roughly half of which came from the US treasury, with the rest from the anticipated revenues fro oil that had been discovered in the area. It was the need for a stable environment in which to exploit this oil that had driven the need for such a settlement in the first place.

Any Alaskan with at least one fourth native blood ancestry is entitled to a share of the proceeds of their respective corporations, which bear names like “The Aluet Corporation”, “Bering Straits Native Corporation”, and “Ukpeagvik Inuipiat Corporation”.

So, as well as engaging in war games with the US army in Kitgum, perhaps the NRM government would like to also learn how the United States managed to build itself into a strong country worth partnering with in the first place.

A strong nation can only be built on a strong constitutional foundation, where all historical problems -however costly, late in the day, small and “obsolete” they may appear to be to those in power- are resolved for once and for all.

One of the origins of the Buganda-Obote 1966 crisis was the disagreements over the referendum regarding the contested “counties” between Buganda and Bunyoro. After supporting Obote’s insistence on enforcing results of the vote, Bunyoro found itself being abolished alongside Buganda in Obote’s post-1966 constitution.

When the suppressed Buganda nationalism propelled the NRM’s rise to power, the demands for restoration of Buganda’s “things” led to a law that restored Bunyoro’s and other kingdoms as well.

It is clear that the fates of Buganda and Bunyoro are twinned, just as Buganda’s first substantive Kabaka is supposedly the younger twin brother of the then King of Bunyoro.

In failing to make common cause with Buganda, and allowing itself to instead be used as hammer against it, Bunyoro once again opts for trying killing rats over saving her burning house.

In the end, it risks achieving neither.

baganda should take note – secede

baganda should take note – secede

Why are more nsuf fund embezzlers, swiftly prosecuted and imprisoned than; gava, aids funds, chogm, medical drugs thieves, and colonial Uganda state corrupt officials in government?  Why is it that the Inspector General of Government (igg), Director of Public Prosecution (dpp), Inspector General of Police(igp), Criminal Investigation Department (cid) etc., for the majority 27 years nrm came from western Uganda?

are there no trained people in the above fields from; west nile, acholi, lango, tororo, busoga or bugishu??!!

There is more potential to build small power projects in Western Northern Uganda. However there are more micro dams being built in Western Uganda!

Baganda must secede from the colonial Uganda state, for our nations’ and children’s survival.

nrm and its adversaries fronts themselves as development angels, however; the same organisations never supports Buganda ambitions as they support their kins, and Bayindi on tax payers supported funds for Munyonyo projects, Kampala Wetland destruction called development, Golf Course Investment, bidco Kalangala forest destruction or Lugogo wetland destruction with super markets:

Now you the Baganda why didn’t nrm government support Buganda Kingdom bid to;

1. Turn kibuye market into a modern supper market as nrm supported Nakumat, or Garden City even when chogm was coming?! They are giving Indians free money to build useless hotels, not Baganda to build their lives in rotten Owino, Nakawa, Kalererwe, Natete, Mengo, Kasubi markets! In Luwero, so-called veterans were building a market on a sole playground field in the area used by children and local communities!
2. For bidco products, couldn’t baganda small oil seeds farmers and producers, be supported by nrm government to grow; maize, cotton seeds, sunflower seeds, cocoa in Bugerere/Mukono, Ensogasoga in Bulemezi and Bugerere etc.?!  Is it a premeditated strategy to turn Baganda in beggars in their own land?
3. Couldn’t nrm government support Buganda Kingdom’s bid to turn vast lands in Bulemezi, Bugerere, Singo into commercial agricultural investment and thereupon support Baganda Land owners in these investments when the libyans are allegedly being allocated land in bunyoro free of charge?!! At least the colonial state could compel Baganda to produce by instruments of the law!
4. Why hasn’t nrm killed those stopping Bagandas’ bid to turn tonnes of urban waste into electricity, a World Bank Funded Project? It is because they nrm want to maintain Buganda colonial state slave-master relationship?
5. Baganda’s bid to start a public transport system in kampala, was frustrated while bus owners from Ankole and Kigezi are investing heavily in the bus transport. The design and a huge document for these plans are gathering dust. This is not investment according to nrm economic growth philosophy!
6. Why are baganda cattle farmers in Bulemezi, Bugerere, Singo, Sembabule not given milk-cooling plants while those in Ankole are supported with taxpayers funding?
7. nrm has supported matooke project in Ankole and looked on when vanilla growers in Buganda suffer – can you imagine a difference in price, value and technological input cost, of the two products?
8. How many nrm coffee processing plants have been built in buganda coffee producing regions to revamp production and if not, then why?!
9. Where are the kakiri housing estates and I ask you Baganda, how many Baganda earn over a million shillings to be able to buy Libyians owned nhcc housing estates?! Are Baganda relegated to slums

Let no single Muganda be blinded by nrm and its adversary’s politics. The five million Baganda have no pillars to stand on at this material time, when their economy is tramped on.

There is no nation that has ever been build by foreigners – Buganda has to rely on herself.

Bwanika, Nakyesawa Luwero.

General analysis of the land problems in Uganda

I would like to clarify a few points:

1.       Though I mentioned on UAH forum that some UPDF guys had bought land and could even manage to evict bibanja holders using their muscle, I did NOT say this is a rampant phenomenon!  I did NOT by any means imply that it is only the army guys benefiting from this land business.  In fact only a few army guys have been involved in these land wrangles to my knowledge.

2.       I also said cowardly landlords are selling their land which is practically useless to them because of the strange phenomenon of permanent dual ownership.  The muscle men are not necessarily Army men.  In Uganda, muscle comes in many different forms – money, political power, influence peddling, corruption, etc.  As a matter of fact, many of the prominent cases of evictions of bibanja holders that have appeared in the papers have been carried out by businessmen (one of them a prominent female businesswoman!)  It is completely misleading to assume that evictions are only carried by the army or NRM bigwigs!  When it comes to all these deals, political inclinations are not a factor – it is just the level of the profit from the deal and the capacity to carry it out – and I assure you, anyone with enough money to splash around has the capacity.

3.       This dual ownership of land in the recently passed land bill is not a recent reality – it has been here since 1900!   The 1998 Land Act and other amendments have only entrenched it because – let us face it – many lives are affected by this problem.  It cannot be wished away.  The New Vision conducted a survey of the land ownership problem and published its findings.  The findings show that most of the people (about 70%) in Buganda are bibanja holders!  This basically means they are living on other people’s property!  Is this believable?  Yes!  I will give you an example from Mbale – where I originate.  Although there is NO dual ownership of land in most of Mbale, very few people have land titles.  They own the land by customary tenure and can only lay claim using relatives and neighbors as witnesses.  This basically means that if one was able to bribe all these relatives and neighbors, one could actually take over another person’s land.  Why?  There is no record of it anywhere.  But why haven’t the Bagisu surveyed their land and got land titles to it?  This is the same problem with many peasants in the villages of Buganda.  They have been using their land holdings from time immemorial with just a cursory acknowledgment of the landlord.  It is only now when land has become such a hot cake in central Uganda that bibanja holders, all of a sudden, are faced with the specter of eviction.  It is only now that bibanja holders (those with means) are scrambling to regularize their occupancy by trying to acquire titles to their bibanja.  Given that all the land in Buganda was parceled out to only 3,000 out of a million people (perhaps) in 1900, and many of these have not bothered to buy titles, it is conceivable that the majority of Baganda are still in that state as revealed by New Vision.

4.       Willing buyer – willing seller, is it true?  Yes!  As it is now, the government cannot simply tell bibanja holders to vacate the land of land owners (given the history).  The 1998 Land Act sought to make it difficult for landlords to evict bibanja holders but there were many loopholes in it that were used by the landlords to evict the bibanja holders.  So for those landlords who do not have the “muscle”, the land titles are equal to almost ZERO value.  Now, under such a circumstance, any price that a landlord gets for the land is a profit because in the Books of Accounts, such an Asset is valueless.  So a landlord who manages to get even 0.5million per acre, makes a very big profit.  That is economics.  Although some banks have been accepting collateral of such land titles, many have been shying away from them.  So it is a willing buyer, willing seller alright!

5.       The land policy can never say that now foreigners can own land in Uganda.  No!  The land policy can only specify how land should be used by those who already own it.  Ownership issues have already been dealt with in the constitution.  Foreigners have the permission to LEASE (not own) land for commercial purposes.  They do not need the land policy to get this green light.  But the land policy for example can state:

a.       that everyone in Uganda who possesses land, must develop it within a certain period of time, otherwise it can be forfeited or the government can force such a person to sell it the land.  Large tracts of land in Buganda and the north are not developed for decades.

b.      That towns and cities should as much as possible not be built over arable land but should be located in arid or rocky places.

c.       That roads should as much as possible be constructed over land that cannot be used for agriculture.  The same goes for infrastructure like schools, hospitals, offices, etc.

d.      That all land that has no crops must have trees.  It can make statements on forest reserves, game reserves and parks, wetlands, etc.

e.      That henceforth, land must not be fragmented below one acre (this is a real problem in Mbale and Kigezi).  Outlawing land fragmentation is very important.  Although landlords claim bibanja holders fragment land, that is not fragmentation we are talking about.

f.        Etc.

6.       Point (5) above means that there is no insider dealing by anybody and the UPDF in particular.  There cannot be anything in the land policy that makes it imperative for someone to buy up large chunks of land now!

7.       Yes, the Land Amendment Bill, makes the land assets more useless to the land owners by constraining their actions on the land!  But that is precisely what it is intended to do.  Is this a good thing?  Economically and financially, NO.  But socially and politically it is.

8.       Can 20 people lay claim (100%) to the same kibanja?  No.  This is not possible because at any one time, there are only two people who own a particular kibanja – the title holder and the kibanja holder!  Either the title moves to another entity or the kibanja holder bequeaths the kibanja to an heir or sells to another holder.  Does the kibanja holder have 100% claim on the kibanja?  Only when he/she regularly pays the nominal ground rent!  When he defaults, the landlord has procedures to follow to evict him from the land.

9.       As to whether the UPDF is worse than the previous armies or the NRMO is a den of thieves!  Well that is political and you are entitled to your opinion.  It is not the topic for today so I will skip.

Rogers Mataka

UAH forumist

Mbale,Kampala

9000 Sq miles exist but they were not reserved for future generations of the Baganda

Kabaka's lake(posted by Abbey Semuwemba)

Dear readers,

Some Baganda are very deceived if they say the 9,000 sq. miles of land was reserved for future generations of the Baganda!  There is no where in the 1900 Uganda Agreement that you get such a thing.  The New Vision recently published the whole of that document for their perusal.  Please educate me and show where in that document it is written that the 9,000 sq. miles were “for Buganda future generations”.  That is just a figment of their imagination.

Let me point it out to you that in 1900, the British did not see themselves leaving Uganda so soon after only 62 years!  When they allocated themselves the 9,000 sq. miles, it was for the user of the administrators of the territory.  It was also a show of power over the subjugated and colonized territory of Buganda!  This is something many people forget.  They did not only acquire this kind of land in Buganda but all over Uganda.  This was land that the central authority of Her Majesty the Queen could use for whatever reason they saw as necessary.  It is on this land they could build schools, hospitals, roads, industries, cities, etc.  Some of this land was wild forest, swamps and marshes, rivers and lakes.  If the British had been very interested in settling in Uganda, they would have settled their people on these lands from which the colonists would have spread to other areas.  Please go read the text of the Buganda Agreement of 1900 again!

In 1963, when the British were prematurely forced to get out, they passed this land, over which they had been exercising full control, to the political authority of the time: Buganda Government.  Remember Buganda was granted independence earlier with a provision to federate with the rest of Uganda.  So at that point, there was no other public political entity that the British could grant the authority to manage the 9,000 sq. miles.  When Buganda as a political entity federated with the rest of Uganda in 1963, they were still a political entity and the terms of the federation allowed them to control the 9,000 sq. miles in public interest.  When that arrangement collapsed in 1967, Buganda government as a political entity ceased to exist in Uganda up to now.  What they controlled was taken over by the central government and has subsequently been passed over to local governments in those areas.  There is no political entity called Buganda Government in Uganda as we speak.  What was restored in 1993 was not the Buganda Government of 1963.

Therefore there is no political entity to which central government can relinquish control of the 9,000 sq. miles.  The nearest to this are the local governments at district level.  And indeed all this land is currently controlled by the District administrations of Buganda region.  So forget it, as constituted now, the Buganda cultural institution CANNOT be given control over the 9,000 sq. mls.  They are not elected and neither are they accountable to any one.

From 1900 to now, is only three generations.  Is this what some Bganda are calling “for generations”?  Is this what some Baganda call a long tradition?

People should remember that before 1900 everybody owned their own land.  Some could welcome visitors or those who asked in good faith to live on the property.  Of course the Kabaka being the supreme leader at that time, could punish someone by having his land reallocated to another person but this was rare.  In Europe where landlords were both owners of the land as well as administrators of the King, it was quite common for one landlord to be dispossessed by the King.  For hundreds of years, up to now, a few people owned land.  In most cases the warrior families acquired these lands by force by conquering and murdering the original owners or by the pleasure of the king.  The bulk of the people were either squatters (bibanja holders) or they relocated to the slums of the sprawling towns like London or Paris.  When there were wars (very frequently), these were the cannon fodder.

So the phenomenon of kibanja and landlord only came to Uganda in 1900.  So what long tradition are they talking about?

Rogers Mataka

UAH forumist working with Bank of Uganda

MORE HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS: KABAKA MUTESA TO ALL WHITE MEN

[no date]

To all the English who are with Colonel Gordon.

Oh! all the men of England, hear what is said in this letter, for I am Mutesa, King of Uganda. I will tell you the truth, because I am a King and will not lie. Because I am on your side.  If at times I say I do not want white men, it is in order to pretend, because if I always say it, others will say why does Mutesa want white men and does not ask for us.

Therefore I say in my heart I will receive in secret the English letter. Therefore I pray you, listen my friend to what I say. Send a letter to England and tell them that Mutesa wants one of the priests of England.

But you yourselves come here and quickly so that I can tell you all that I have in my heart and then you can go to England with joy.  May the Grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ, and the Love of God, and the Fellowship of the Holy Ghost be with us all always. Amen.

From Mutesa, King of Uganda, son of Suna.

ISLAM WAS ‘STATE’ RELIGION IS SUNA’S BUGANDA

Apolo Kagwa and Henry Wright Duta Kitakule, ‘How Religion came to Uganda ‘.

During the reign of Suna he was visited by some Arabs: Medi Abraham, and Kyera, and Amulain, and Mina, and Katukula Mungazija, and Zigeya Mubulusi.

Of these he liked Medi Abraham best, and gave him a great many presents, ivory, women and slaves.

Later on Medi Abraham told Suna, when he saw him killing people, that, although he killed them with so little thought, yet there was a God who created them, and from Him he had obtained his kingdom, and the people he governed, and that he himself was created by Him.

This Suna did not believe, for he said he knew his Lubare gods and they had given him his kingdom, but Medi Abraham repeated his words every time he was called to see him.

Some time afterwards Suna asked Medi, ‘Where is there a God greater than I?’ And Medi told him that there is a God who will raise up all who believe in Him, and they will go to Paradise .

When Suna understood th s, he agreed that Medi should read to him, but only now and then, and he got through the first four chapters of the Koran.

When he had got hold of these, more or less by word of mouth, Medi returned to the coast and did not come again to Uganda, and soon after this Suna died and Mutesa succeeded him, and made his capital at Banda, half-way between Mengo and Ngogwe. He also encouraged Arabs to visit him. Katukula Hali and his friends, and Hamuli Musirimu, and Makwega, a Swahili. Mutesa made friends of these and gave them many things just as his father Suna did before him.

King Mutesa asked Katukula what it was his ‘father used to talk to them about, when they visited him’, and he told him, ‘we used to tell him about God, and King of Kings, and that He will raise people from the dead’.

King Mutesa asked him, ‘Are you not lying? Is there a resurrection from the dead?’ They told him that indeed there was, and that those who learnt the words of God, when they died would rise again.

So King Mutesa said to Katukula, ‘Well then, come and teach me to read,’ and brought a Swahili called Makwega, who taught the king every day, and he learned Mohammedanism very quickly. Some others learned with him whose names are Musisi Sabakaki and Basude Sabawali of Kigalagala, who is now Mutola, and Myakonyi Omumyuka of Myu­kanya, and later Kauta Mukasa, who was Katikiro, and Mujabi Omuta­buza, and Tebukoya, and Sembuzi and Wakibi.

These were first taught, but afterwards the converts were slow in coming forward.

When the king went from his capital, Banda, and went to Nakawa he persevered with his reading and fasted during the first fast, and he then ordered all his subjects to read Mohammedanism. He also learned to write in Arabic: the Arab Wamisi brought the Mohammedan Kibali who taught the king.

Then Mutesa came from Nakawa to Nabulagala, and thence to Rubaga, where he stayed some time. He again ordered his people to read, but he saw they were not giving their minds to it. So he said to his head district chiefs, ‘I want to know if people are learning to believe in Islam well.’ His chiefs told him they were. ‘Well,’ he said, ‘if they are, how do they salute each other as Mohammedans?’ They replied, ‘Some salute thus – Sala­maleku dekimu musalamu – others, Sibwakede bwatulise.’

He saw they had not learned to salute, and found that those who had begun to really learn were very few indeed, and he gave orders that every man who had not learnt was to learn the salutation, Salamu alekumu ale­kumu salaamu or Shabuluheri. And in-anger the King gave orders that everyone refusing to learn was to be seized.

Many who would not learn were then seized, called infidels and killed. Then every married man fixed up a stone in his yard to pray at, and every chief built a mosque, and a great many people became readers, but were not circumcised, and all the chiefs learned that faith.

From the translation by, C. W. Hattersley in  Uganda Notes, May 1902, p. 35.

Suna: Kabaka Suna died in 1856 and was succeeded by Mutesa I, Kabaka 1856-84.

Medi Abraham: Ahmed bin Ibrahim, trader from Zanzibar .

DALLINGTON MAFTAA, PPS OF KABAKAS MUTESA I AND MWANGA

Addressees,

The African chap in that picture is one Dallington Maftaa, arrived in Buganda in 1876 as part of HM Stanley’s entourage.  He is responsible for all the correspondences from the Buganda royal court to the outside world.  In the Picture, he is with Mapeera (Father/Mon pere Lourdel) during Kabaka Mwanga’s reign.

In one of the letters to Muwanga, the writers are Dallington and Kabaka Mutesa.

1 WK LATER, GOLD AND GUNS NOT COMING: KABAKA MUTESA CONVERTS TO CHRISTIANITY

April 3, 1876

Nabulagala

From King Mutesa, the greatest King of the interior of Africa, 3 April 1876.

This letter is from M’tesa, the greatest King in Africa. It is I Mutesa, King of Uganda, Usoga and Karagwe. Listen then to my word which I tell you. Oh! thou European  I have become your true brother, I am a Christian, only I have not yet been baptised.

I believe in God the Holy Father, Almighty, Creater of heaven and earth, and in the Lord Jesus Christ, the only true Son of God, begotten of the Father before the creation of the earth, He is God of God.

May your Queen be a mother to me, and may I become her son. May her sons and daughters be my brothers and sisters, It is I, Mutesa, King of Uganda.  Formerly the Mahommedans tempted me saying that Mahom­med was the first and last of good people, but we find this  is not the truth but a lie. May we both be united.

Oh! Colonel Gordon, listen to this letter which says Oh! God, let there be peace between England and Uganda. Oh! may England be joyful always. Oh! Colonel Gordon, come quickly to me, and, if you do not come, at least send one of your white men, who you have with you, I want the reply to this letter to be printed.

May God be with the Queen, May God be with your Majesty and I beg you to send me paper, ink and pens, because all my paper is finished.

Mutesa King of Uganda

April 3, 1876.

HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS: KABAKA MUTESA TO COLONEL GORDON

6 Februay, 1876.

To Sir Canell Gorlden

My Dear Freind Gorden hear this my word be not angry with Kaber­ega Sultan of Unyoro. I been head that you been brought two manwar ships but I pray you fight not with these Wanyoro for they know not what is good and what is bad. I am, Mutesa king of Uganda for if you fight with governour if you fight with governour you fight with the king.

I will ask you one thing but let it may please you all ye Europeion for I say if I want to go to Bommbey if the Governour and if the Goyernour of Bommbey refuse me to past will l not find the orther road therefore I pray you my friends hear this my letter stop for a moment if you want to fight put ships in the river nile take west and north and I will take east and south and let us put wanyoro in to the middle and fight against them but first send me answer from this letter.  Because  I want to be a freind of the English. I am Mutesa son of Suna king of Uganda let God be with your Majesty even you all Amen.

Mutesa King of Uganda

Februay 6, 1876.

KABAKA MUTESA TO COLONEL GORDON: NJAGALA FEEZA, ZAABU, MUNDU NE’DDIINI

24 March 1876.

Kabaka Mutesa 1 and Dallington to Gordon,

To Sir Colonel Gordon, My dear, Friend, I wish you good day. It is I Mutesa, King of Uganda who sends you this letter. I wish to be the friend of the white men, Therefore, hear my words which I say.

I. I want a priest who will show me,the way of God.

2. I want gold, silver, iron and bronze.

3.1 want clothing for my people and myself to wear.

4. I want excellent guns and good cannons.

5. I want to cause to be built good houses for my country.

6. I want my people to know God.

Mutesa King of Uganda

24 March 1876.

mutesa’s letter to queen victoria

April 3, 1876

Nabulagala

From King Mutesa, the greatest King of the interior of Africa , 3 April 1876.

This letter is from M’tesa, the greatest King in Africa . It is I Mutesa, King of Uganda , Usoga and Karagwe. Listen then to my word which I tell you. Oh! thou European  I have become your true brother, I am a Christian, only I have not yet been baptised.

I believe in God the Holy Father, Almighty, Creater of heaven and earth, and in the Lord Jesus Christ, the only true Son of God, begotten of the Father before the creation of the earth, He is God of God.

May your Queen be a mother to me, and may I become her son. May her sons and daughters be my brothers and sisters, It is I, Mutesa, King of Uganda .  Formerly the Mahommedans tempted me saying that Mahom­med was the first and last of good people, but we find this  is not the truth but a lie. May we both be united.

Oh! Colonel Gordon, listen to this letter which says Oh! God, let there be peace between England and Uganda . Oh! may England be joyful always. Oh! Colonel Gordon, come quickly to me, and, if you do not come, at least send one of your white men, who you have with you, I want the reply to this letter to be printed.

May God be with the Queen, May God be with your Majesty and I beg you to send me paper, ink and pens, because all my paper is finished.

Mutesa King of Uganda

April 3, 1876.

Lance Corporal (Rtd) Otto Patrick